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ABSTRACT 
Debates on poverty relief have often focused on redistributing resources to the 
poor. In this thesis, my first aim is to demonstrate that Immanuel Kant’s 
system of right consistently supports both domestic poverty relief by means of 
public redistribution, and relief to impoverished foreigners by granting them 
refuge. I contend that Kant’s discussion of right implies that the state is 
unconditionally obliged to redistribute resources to impoverished citizens, so 
as to protect domestic public right. But this duty does not extend to 
redistribution across borders, because this form of poverty relief is justified 
only as a duty of the state to secure public right for its own citizens. Instead, 
Kant’s discussion of international and cosmopolitan right suggests that states 
are obliged to assist economic refugees, who are imperiled by their exclusion 
from a civil rightful condition and have a right to hospitality. Although dealing 
with poverty is essential in protecting the human right to freedom, the 
defensibility of a particular means of relief is ultimately context-dependent. 
There is no single ‘right’ way to relieve poverty. My second aim is to defend 
the argument that the poor’s right to relief in both domestic and supranational 
contexts is nevertheless unenforceable. Because a supranational sovereign is 
theoretically impossible, it cannot be just for states to be externally coerced 
into redistributing resources to impoverished citizens or accommodating 
economic refugees. Ultimately, the poor’s right to relief is merely provisional. 
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1. A Kantian Argument for Poverty Relief 
My aim in this thesis is to examine the problem of poverty and to provide a 
systematic treatment of the normative issues involved in justifying poverty 
relief. For the purposes of this thesis, I leave open the possibility of 
interpreting the duty of relief as one of beneficence,1 and focus instead on 
relief as a matter of justice. I aim to determine whether the duty of relief is 
enforceable2 and how it could be justifiable, even if it is based merely on 
provisional right. I propose a framework for conceiving of poverty relief as a 
duty owed by the state to persons within and beyond its borders. Focusing on 
Immanuel Kant’s system of right and his treatment of poverty, I show how 
that system supports two kinds of state-led poverty relief: domestic relief 
through public redistribution, and relief to impoverished foreigners by 
granting refuge. In this thesis, I essentially propose and defend my own 
interpretation of what Kant actually said and could have said on the topic of 
poverty. My main contribution to the discussion of poverty relief as a matter 
of global justice is the argument that there is no single ‘right’ way to relieve 
poverty, and that relief efforts need not necessarily involve redistribution to 
the poor. Although poverty relief is theoretically essential to protecting the 
human right to freedom, the defensibility of a particular means of relief is 
ultimately context-dependent. I argue that the state is obliged to provide relief 
to impoverished citizens and grant entry to economic refugees. Kant’s system 
                                                
1 See, for instance, Robert B. Louden, Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human 
Beings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 66. 
2 In this thesis, I will be working with Kant’s conception of enforceability (i.e. that rights are 
enforceable only under an overarching coercive authority). Since I am focusing on an 
exegetical reading of Kant’s ideas, I leave the task of critically examining the soundness of 
this conception for further exploration elsewhere.  
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of right provides a framework for defending these fundamentally different 
means of relief. 
Arguably, Kant is the only author to provide a single model of justice across 
the national, international, and cosmopolitan levels.3 This model unfolds from 
a single ‘axiom of external freedom’ (the assumption of an original right to 
freedom that can coexist with that of everyone else according to a universal 
law) and the postulates of private and public right.4 Kant’s methodical and 
broad treatment of right bridges the analytic gap between justice and economic 
redistribution by making it possible to conceive of extreme economic need as 
deprivation of the innate human right to freedom.5 I will demonstrate how the 
practical relation between the right to freedom and the right to food or money, 
implies that human beings have a right to material conditions under which 
they are not dependent on private charity. I argue that Kant’s political theory 
provides a systematic approach to understanding poverty in terms of its 
pernicious effects on relations between agents.  
My argument runs counter to libertarian and other interpretations of Kant’s 
ethics, which consider poverty relief to either be an imperfect duty of 
beneficence 6  or a problem extrinsic to public right. Some of these 
interpretations maintain that Kant’s views on welfare are “incompatible with 
his legal philosophy and, hence, that there is no room for redistributive 
                                                
3 B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka, Kant's Doctrine of Right: A Commentary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1. 
4 Chapter 2.I will elaborate on this “axiom of external freedom”. 
5 It is important to note that “the German Recht does not distinguish between right as a 
legitimate claim to exercise a personal capacity and justice as an impersonal body of laws 
governing action—especially in Kant’s hands.” See Ian Hunter, “The Metaphysics of Law,” 
in Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 323. 
6 See Allen Wood, Kantian Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 193-94, 
for a discussion of this interpretive approach. 
     3 
 
policies in his political theory.” 7  Others regard redistribution as merely 
instrumental to the achievement of some other ends, or as a duty of virtue 
rather than of justice, or as integral to a just and rightful condition defined in 
egalitarian terms. In contrast, I argue that for Kant, the state is responsible not 
for promoting welfare but for relieving poverty, understood as a threat to 
public right. My discussion draws primarily on Kant’s Doctrine of Right 
(1797), in which Kant’s “specific goal is to ground the obligation to obey laws 
which govern external acts.”8  I supplement my interpretation of it with 
reference to Perpetual Peace (1795) (especially in my discussion of 
international right and poverty relief) and, to a lesser extent, On the Common 
Saying (1793). There are large discrepancies among these works of Kant on 
justice, although the Doctrine of Right can be considered Kant’s “final 
statement on law and rights.”9  
This thesis is primarily exegetical. I start with Kant’s ideas and contribute 
some original insights and arguments that go beyond the secondary literature I 
examine. My discussion is divided into five main parts. The next chapter 
identifies the theoretical necessity of public right by elucidating the merely 
provisional nature of innate and private right. The third chapter explicates the 
state’s role in securing public right for its citizens. Because the poor are 
essentially excluded from and thereby threaten public right, I argue that the 
state must guarantee its citizens unconditional poverty relief. The possibility 
that states may nevertheless fail to relieve poverty within their borders raises 
                                                
7 See Sorin Baiasu, “Kant’s Justification of Welfare,” Diametros 39 (2014): 7-10, for a more 
detailed discussion of thinkers who fall under each of these categories of views. 
8 Alexander Kaufman, Welfare in the Kantian State (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 9. 
9 Byrd and Hruschka, 8. 
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the question of whether and how the international community can intervene. 
The fourth chapter explains the conceptual obstacles to instituting a 
supranational sovereign authority. In the fifth chapter, I contend that states are 
obliged to grant refuge to impoverished foreigners, because the cosmopolitan 
right to hospitality suggests that the latter cannot be allowed to perish. 
However, the conceptual impossibility of a supranational sovereign means that 
states cannot be coerced into fulfilling their duties of relief to their own 
citizens or economic refugees. This leads me to conclude in the sixth chapter 
that the poor’s right to relief is ultimately unenforceable and therefore merely 
provisional.  
But what is the normative currency of a merely provisional right? Kant does 
not provide direct answers to this question, but his discussion of the right of 
states10 yields some important insights. The provisional right of states to 
engage one another on the basis of commonly agreed regulations is 
unenforceable, given the lack of an international sovereign and any 
impossibility of top-down enforcement. This lack ensures that the right to 
relief is unenforceable, since states cannot be externally coerced into 
protecting this right. Yet, provisional right matters because it delineates a 
space within which the only viable framework for just interactions must be 
built from the ground up on common agreement. The very idea that 
provisional right is unenforceable therefore suggests two things. First, it is 
entirely up to agents themselves to institute and abide by mutually agreeable 
rules of conduct. Second, this realm of provisional right will always be 
tenuous and fraught with challenges, especially where cooperation between 
                                                
10 Chapter 4 provides a more detailed discussion of the right of states. 
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agents is concerned, since unilateral action and defection may very well go 
unpunished.  
In short, provisional right opens up a normative space that is characterized by 
the collective action problem, where positive right is arguably the best option 
for developing a just system of conduct. My opinion is that Kant considers 
provisional right to be a non-ideal form of justice that faces significant 
problems. Still, he would not deny that agents ought to take a constructive and 
cooperative approach to finding better ways of instituting provisional right, 
however flawed this enterprise may be. Indeed, Kant emphatically states that 
the mere possibility of achieving an ideal obliges us to at least try.11 Although 
ideal (enforceable) justice may be unachievable, the quest for justice cannot 
simply be abandoned. I leave the task of working out how provisional right 
can best be instituted and protected as an avenue for further research, perhaps 








                                                
11 See Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: That May Be True in Theory but It Does 
Not Apply in Practice,” in Practical Philosophy, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 309 (8:307-13). 
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2. The Need for Public Laws 
One of my main arguments in this thesis is that the state is ultimately 
responsible for securing public right for its citizens, which requires that it 
guarantee them unconditional poverty relief. The significance of public right 
must first be understood in terms of the need for universal reciprocal coercion. 
Kant’s system of right begins with the assumption of human beings’ innate 
right to freedom, which entails the postulate of private right to external things. 
These two kinds of right complete the specification of independence between 
persons, but are merely provisional. People can be secure in exercising their 
innate and private rights only under a coercive public institution that 
guarantees their equal freedom. This chapter aims to distil the key principles 
of right via an exegetical discussion of innate, private and public right. These 
principles of right foreground the next chapter’s discussion of the state, its 
system of juridical laws, and its duty to relieve poverty, as integral to Kant’s 
conception of public right. 
 
2.1 Innate Right to Freedom 
Kant’s doctrine of right starts with the assumption of an original, innate 
human right to freedom.12 He states that “[f]reedom (independence from being 
constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of 
every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right 
                                                
12 Patrick Riley suggests that Kant’s claim that “a rational nature exists as an end in itself” is 
teleological in nature and is fully expounded in Kant’s third Critique. See Kant's Political 
Philosophy (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), 58. 
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belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity.”13 Each human being has 
by nature an innate right to freedom and to his or her own body as the primary 
locus of this freedom.14 This innate right to freedom is natural in that it does 
not depend on any act of acquisition;15 it is what would today be called a 
human right, with the difference that for Kant there is only one natural or 
human right, not a multiplicity of rights. Despite the continuing debate over 
whether freedom is good in itself16 or requires positive justification in view of 
the dangers of failing to restrict it,17 I take the innate human right to freedom 
as a conceptual starting point for my thesis. I propose that the innate right to 
freedom can be understood as follows: because human beings are by definition 
equal in their humanity, no one could be entitled (at least originally) to 
dominate another, and therefore all are entitled to be equally free. 
Arguably, the ultimate basis of Kant’s political philosophy is the normative 
idea that each person is rightly entitled to be his or her own master.18 Although 
the innate right to freedom in determining one’s own choices encompasses 
both internal and external freedom19 as different uses of the single faculty of 
free choice,20 Kant considers only the latter as the subject of justice. Internal 
freedom is the capacity for one’s choices to be determined by pure reason 
rather than by “sensible impulses,”21 or one’s sensual drives and desires.22 It 
                                                
13 Immanuel Kant, ”The Metaphysics of Morals,” in Practical Philosophy, translated and 
edited by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 393 (6:237). 
14 Ernest J. Weinrib, “Poverty and Property in Kant's System of Rights,” Notre Dame Law 
Review 78, no. 3 (2003): 804. 
15 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 393 (6:237). 
16 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Kant: The Philosophy of Right (London: Macmillan, 1970), 91. 
17 Allen Rosen, Kant's Theory of Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 41. 
18 Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 4-5. 
19 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 374-75 (6:213). 
20 Hunter, 319. 
21 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 375 (6:213-14). 
22 Byrd and Hruschka, 84-85. 
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consists in “independence from the sensible world (negative internal freedom), 
and simultaneous dependence on the moral law”23 (positive internal freedom), 
which is characterized by choosing to act rightly simply because it is right to 
do so.24 External freedom, in contrast, is independence from the coercive 
choices of others (negative external freedom) and security in being able to 
exercise one’s rights through the institution of public law (positive external 
freedom). 25  The universal law of right—the standard by which Kant 
determines what is just—concerns only “the external and indeed practical 
relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have 
(direct or indirect) influence on each other.”26 In contrast, the requirement that 
“I make it my maxim to act rightly is a demand that ethics makes on me.” 27 
Because my motivations alone could not affect others as my external actions 
could, justice cannot require that I make acting rightly the motivation behind 
my action, for “anyone can be free so long as I do not impair his freedom by 
my external action.”28  
The formulation of external freedom reveals the inherently relational nature of 
right, and derives from the individual’s innate right to freedom the right to be 
one’s own master29 and to set and determine the pursuit of one’s own ends. To 
                                                
23 Ibid., 87. 
24 Kant’s descriptions of freedom as ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ are meant to capture a distinction 
between freedom as independence from external influences (negative freedom) and freedom 
as voluntary adherence and dependence on positive laws (positive freedom). Kant’s use of 
these terms is markedly different from Isaiah Berlin’s well-known distinction between 
negative and positive freedom. See Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays 
on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). 
25 Byrd and Hruschka, 88. 
26 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 387 (6:230). 
27 Ibid., 388. 
28 Ibid., 388. 
29 Byrd and Hruschka (see 82-83) further explain that the individual’s right to external 
freedom consists of five subsidiary rights including “(1) the right to equal treatment under the 
law, (2) the right to legal independence, (3) the right to be presumed innocent until the 
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be vested with this prerogative is to be entitled to exercise one’s agency 
independently of others’ coercive choices. Kant first articulates the relation of 
independence in its most basic form as a constraint on interpersonal 
interactions.30 The innate right to freedom can be understood in terms of 
“independence from being constrained by another's choice,”31 on the condition 
that the exercise of this right could coexist with that of everyone else. 
Conversely, the negation of this right to freedom is dependence on or 
interference from another person.32 The individual’s innate right to freedom 
thus translates into a right to external freedom, which concerns only the 
relation of free choice between interacting agents, and whether the action of 
one is compatible with the freedom of all others.33  
This raises the question of how the innate human right to freedom could be a 
logically coherent concept, given that individuals can come into contact with 
one another and potentially conflict over the exercise of their rights to 
freedom.34 The assumption of the original and innate right to freedom thus 
generates Kant’s axiom of external freedom, which makes possible the 
requirement for everyone to act toward each other according to the universal 
law of right.35 This axiom posits that individual agents are free only to make 
and act on choices that respect everyone else’s freedom, in view of the 
universal law of right—a specific demand of reason that “[a]ny action is right 
if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law, 
                                                                                                                           
contrary is proved, and (4) the right to freedom of expression… [as well as (5)] the right to be 
one’s own master.”  
30 Ripstein, 17. 
31 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 393 (6:237). 
32 Ripstein, 15. 
33 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 387 (6:230). 
34 Byrd and Hruschka, 79. 
35 Ibid., 10. 
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or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone's 
freedom in accordance with a universal law.”36 For instance, Scotty is innately 
free, but he is not free to kill Sulu. Scotty’s murder of Sulu is wrong because it 
denies Sulu the exercise of his own right to freedom. If one could exercise 
one’s innate right to freedom to deprive another person of the capacity to do 
so, this right would be self-defeating and fail to qualify as a universal human 
right. In other words, each person may have an original right to external 
freedom, but this right must be exercised within the limits set by the principle 
of universal law.  
Consequently, any action that hinders a rightful exercise of freedom is wrong. 
Assuming that actions either accord with or contravene the principle of 
universal law, any action that is consistent with everyone’s freedom according 
to this principle is right, and any hindrance to such rightful actions violates 
this principle and is by definition wrong.37 If Kenan’s action or condition does 
not contradict anyone else’s external freedom, then his action or condition is 
right and therefore permissible, because it accords with the principle of 
universal law. If Kel hinders Kenan in the performance of his action or the 
maintenance of his condition, Kel’s hindrance is wrong because it obstructs 
Kenan’s rightful exercise of external freedom, and thereby violates the 
principle of universal law. In short, such hindrance is wrong because it is 
incompatible with everyone’s rightful exercise of freedom. 38  Ultimately, 
wrongdoing denies the capacity for rightful relations between agents by 
violating the principle of universal law. This principle is the only rightful 
                                                
36 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 387 (6:230). 
37 Ibid., 388 (6:231). 
38 Ibid., 387 (6:230-31). 
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limiting condition of the individual’s right to freedom because it is necessary 
to render the exercise of right universally consistent among agents.  
It is also important to note that the aims and outcomes of one’s choices and 
actions, and one’s beneficence or maleficence toward others, are in themselves 
neither right nor wrong.39 These are irrelevant to Kant’s conception of right, 
which is concerned solely with the relation of agents’ free choices and how 
individuals affect each other’s external freedom.40 Specific needs, wishes, 
aims and effects of outcomes are in themselves “purely internal” and cannot 
affect the necessarily ‘external’ relations between agents.41 For instance, I may 
need food to survive, but this alone has no effect on whether my actions are 
compatible with everyone’s freedom. It is only when agents choose to act on 
their respective needs or wishes that the external freedom of others could be 
affected.  
 
2.2 Private Right to External Things  
Kant shows that a complete specification of independence between interacting 
persons requires an account of the possibility that individuals can have 
entitlements to external things to be used in the pursuit of particular ends.42 
Because human beings are “sensibly affected” rational creatures43 situated 
within a material reality,44 the hypothesis that private property is impossible is 
                                                
39 Ibid., 387 (6:230). 
40 Ibid., 387 (6:230).  
41 Otfried Höffe, Kant's Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace, translated by Alexandra 
Newton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 105.  
42 Ripstein, 17. 
43 Hunter, 321. 
44 See Paul Guyer, Kant's System of Nature and Freedom: Selected Essays (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 2005), 242. 
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simply absurd.45 Kant therefore postulates that persons may acquire rights to 
external things, which encompass “the traditional categories of Roman private 
law, relations of property, contract, and status, which govern rights to things, 
to performances by other persons, and, in special cases, rights to other 
persons.”46 However, when human beings use material things, they acquire 
material ends that can conflict with those of others.47 Given the potential for 
conflict, the right to external things is private—in that it concerns rightful 
relations between private individuals48—and also merely provisional prior to 
the formation of a public rightful condition under which it can be guaranteed.  
There are two key elements of the private right to property. First, I have a 
private right to an external thing if I can be wronged by another person’s use 
of this object without my consent.49 If the right to external things was defined 
merely in terms of empirical possession, it would be entirely contingent on 
whoever happened to have physical control over an external object at a given 
time. Subsequently, it would be impossible for one person to wrong another in 
the use of external objects (which depends on first having physical control 
over them). One’s right to an external thing would be essentially meaningless 
because it could not then specify any entitlement against others. Kant suggests 
that private right to external objects must instead be defined in terms of 
“intellectual possession,” which makes it possible for an individual to be 
wronged by others who disturb him or her in the use of an object which he or 
                                                
45 Rosen, 19. 
46 Ripstein, 17. 
47 Hunter, 324. 
48 Helga Varden, “A Kantian Conception of Global Justice,” Review of International 
Studies 37, no. 5 (2011): 2045. 
49 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 401 (6:425). 
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she rightfully owns.50 Put differently, private right to external things must be 
defined in these metaphysical terms51 in order for its logical negation or 
corresponding violation to be defined.  
Second, for external objects to be subject to one’s choices and to be used for 
whatever purposes one sets, one must be free to set them aside while using 
other means at one’s disposal.52 External objects could in principle belong to 
someone else; therefore one must be able to preclude others’ use of these 
objects. I am genuinely entitled to an object only when I have the capacity to 
decide not only when and how it is to be used, but also when and how it is not 
to be used, even when I am not in direct physical control over it. Kant 
describes such entitlement as “a merely rightful connection of the subject's 
will with that object in accordance with the concept of intelligible possession, 
independently of any relation to it in space and time.”53 For instance, Barbara 
has a right to her house even when she is away on vacation, which means that 
someone else could wrong her by infringing on her right to determine how her 
house is to be used. Kenneth could infringe on Barbara’s right to her house by 
making himself at home while she is away. Even if he were to leave her house 
in the exact same condition, he would still have wronged her by using her 
house for purposes she did not endorse.  
In general, private right specifies an authorization to subject all others to an 
obligation to refrain from using the external objects of one’s choice. This 
                                                
50 Ibid., 403 (6:249). 
51 For some contrasting views on the defensibility of Kant’s ideas on property rights, see 
Robert B. Pippin, “Mine and Thine? The Kantian State,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Kant and Modern Philosophy, edited by Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), p. 437; and Susan Meld Shell, The Rights of Reason: A Study of Kant's 
Philosophy and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 144. 
52 Ripstein, 60-64. 
53 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 407 (6:254). 
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obligation is grounded in the postulate that one can first take external objects 
into possession, and the use of these objects subsequently lies within one’s 
physical capacity and freedom of choice.54 
 
2.3 Justifying Coercion 
The material aspect of human nature not only explains how the innate right to 
freedom entails the postulate of private right to external things. It also 
establishes the potential for conflict and wrongdoing between human beings 
when they exercise their rights, despite their innate equality and freedom. The 
finite material conditions of human life and the fact that human beings are not 
solitary creatures together present opportunities for such conflict. For instance, 
space is finite just as a ten-dollar bill or any other resource is finite. Spock and 
Bones both spot a ten-dollar bill on the pavement, and although each is 
entitled to claim the ten-dollar bill for his personal purposes, they argue over 
who gets to do so. Because occupancy is exclusive, separate persons who each 
occupy space can come into conflict over its use.55 Spock and Bones may 
therefore also argue over who gets to sit in the window seat on the plane. 
Given the potential for conflict that arises in spatial and physical terms, 
adequate principles of justice are required to reconcile the competing external 
claims of various agents.56 In line with this, justifiable coercion consists in 
force that is used solely to promote justice, and persons should be coerced 
                                                
54 Ibid., 405-6 (6:247-51). 
55 Ripstein, 12. 
56 Thomas Pogge, “Kant’s Theory of Justice,” in Kant and Law, edited by B. Sharon Byrd and 
Joachim Hruschka (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), 410-411. 
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exactly insofar as is necessary to render their respective domains of external 
freedom compatible.57  
Although coercion limits the exercise of everyone’s innate right to external 
freedom, it is intrinsically justifiable. Coercion58 is not merely permissible 
because it could be consistent with everyone’s right to freedom.59  It is 
necessary in bringing about a rightful state of affairs because universal 
reciprocal coercion60 brings the conduct of agents into conformity with the 
standards of universal law. The legal principle of preventing or punishing 
violations of right presumes that “a hindrance to a hindrance of an effect itself 
promotes that effect,” from which it follows that right can be authoritatively 
enforced.61 Kant explains that “coercion which constrains everyone to pay his 
debts can coexist with the freedom of everyone, including that of debtors,” in 
accordance with universal law.62 Kant thus advocates the institutional use of 
force to preserve individual freedoms and, paradoxically, the possibility of 
legitimate external coercion is the very means to achieving freedom from 
external coercion.63  
Such justifiable coercion also exemplifies the conceptual distinction between 
justice and virtue. Concerning “only external grounds for determining 
                                                
57 Pogge, “Kant’s Theory of Justice,” 411. 
58 See Ripstein, 81-82. Ripstein also explains that two types of coercion are consistent with 
right: (1) prophylactic coercion which prospectively hinders hindrances by others, e.g. locking 
one’s door to prevent burglary, and (2) coercion used retrospectively, e.g. reclaiming stolen 
goods from a burglar. 
59 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 389 (6:232). 
60 Kant argues that the concept of right can only be presented in terms of “a fully reciprocal 
and equal coercion brought under a universal law and consistent with it,” since right 
understood as the capacity to obligate another person must also be understood to entail the 
possibility of enforcing compliance with this obligation, analogous to “the [a priori] 
possibility of bodies moving freely under the law of the equality of action and reaction.” See 
Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 389 (6:232). 
61 Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom, 199. 
62 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 389 (6:232). 
63 Howard Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983) 70-71. 
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choice,”64 justice requires mere conformity of actions with right, just as 
rightful lawgiving demands mere conformity of an action with law. Justice 
does not depend on the virtue of agents who do the right thing simply because 
it is right. It depends instead on the possibility that agents can be compelled, in 
ways that are consistent with the freedom of each, to do the right thing. Justice 
is therefore directly connected “by the principle of contradiction [to] an 
authorization to coerce someone who infringes upon it.”65 The theoretical 
possibility of wrongdoing reflects the fact that agents with both rational and 
empirical natures interact with one another.66 Although the human being is a 
unitary subject of choice, its dual nature means that it must be governed by 
two kinds of law. Moral law governs man’s rational or intelligible being, 
while juridical laws are necessary to govern the effect of material factors on 
man’s external freedom.67 The ethical concern with internal motives that 
determine agents’ choices and actions68 contrasts with the juridical concern 
with ‘externally’ imputable motives—the capacity of agents for purposive 
action.69 Justice, for Kant, requires only that agents exercise this capacity in 
ways that are consistent with everyone’s purposiveness.70  
As an ancillary point, this explains why Kant does not regard juridical law as 
compensation for the failure of human beings to obey the moral law, but rather 
“as a distinct kind of legislation, suited to rational beings whose sensible 
                                                
64 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 389 (6:232). 
65 Ibid., 387 (6:230-31). 
66 Höffe, “Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace,” 92.  
67 Hunter, 321. 
68 Rosen, 135. 
69 Shell, 123 (footnote). 
70 Ernest J. Weinrib, “Law as Idea of Reason,” in Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy, 
edited by Howard Williams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 39. 
     17 
 
nature necessitates interaction through the possession of material goods.”71 
Justice does not specify a system of rules observance of which simply 
precludes conflict. Even if all human beings were good, juridical laws would 
still be conceptually necessary to reconcile their innate rights on a universal 
basis. In a world where people are capable of obstructing one another’s 
external freedom, 72  juridical laws constitute the “minimal—but also the 
maximally enforceable—moral conditions” for their interaction.73 Juridical 
laws are at best indirectly ethical because they require only an action in 
conformity with duty, whereas morality has an additional and stricter 
demand—that the fulfillment of duty is an end for the agent and the 
determining ground for her action.74 This conception of law reflects Kant’s 
emphatic distinction between justice and ethics, as well as his “dualist 
conception of man as both an empirical and intelligible being” limited by 
material reality.75  
 
2.4 The Need for Public Right 
Although the first two stages of independence—conceived in terms of innate 
and private right—complete the specification of interpersonal interaction, 
individuals cannot be secure in their enjoyment of these rights without a 
public authority to enforce them. In the ‘state of nature’, or the absence of a 
                                                
71 Hunter, 322. 
72 Thomas Pogge, ”Is Kant’s Rechtslehre a ‘Comprehensive Liberalism?” in Kant's 
Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays, edited by Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 139. 
73 Weinrib, “Law as Idea of Reason,” 40. 
74 Höffe, “Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace,” 86. Williams also argues that 
legality for Kant is a necessary precondition for morality, since virtuous actions must also be 
legal, although legal actions may not be virtuous. See Kant's Political Philosophy, 68. 
75 Ibid., 67. 
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civil society that secures personal property through public laws,76 the original 
innate right to freedom and the acquired private right to external objects are 
merely provisional.77 The lawless state of nature is structurally unjust because 
individual rights lack systematic protection 78  against personal injury by 
others.79 These natural and private rights can be enjoyed only in a civil 
condition.80  
Even when one enjoys negative freedom from external injury, one is not free 
in the positive external sense until one enjoys conclusive rights under a public 
rightful condition. Given that everyone has an “immediate and unchosen 
dependence on the soil,” the acquisition of material things is unavoidable and 
human beings are all potentially interdependent in their use of the earth.81 
While reason determines that agents must exercise their freedom in ways that 
are consistent with the freedom of all, the uncontroversial empirical notion 
that the human world is finite suggests that some actions unavoidably limit the 
freedom of others.82 Originally, everyone is innately equal in his or her right to 
freedom. The right to external things depends on unilateral acquisition that is 
consistent with the innate right of the proprietor. However, it also depends on 
the proprietor’s capacity to subordinate others to his or her purposes without 
being reciprocally bound to them, which is inconsistent with the innate 
                                                
76 See Kant, MM, 397 (6:242). 
77 Arguably, the state of nature “exists wherever there is no established juridical system 
capable of enforcing laws to protect individual rights… [and] is therefore historically real for 
Kant, not simply a heuristic device: it exists in all prepolitical societies and whenever systems 
of public legal justice break down.” See Rosen, 9. 
78 Rosen, 10. 
79 Murphy, 104. 
80 Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy, 194. 
81 Shell, 130. 
82 Pippin, 432. 
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equality of all.83 Kant therefore demonstrates how public right—understood as 
the totality of laws enforcing individual rights in a collective setting—is 
necessary to mitigate the insecurity that characterizes the state of nature.  
Kant thus introduces a postulate of public right, which declares 
Do not wrong anyone (neminem laede) even if, to avoid doing so, 
you should have to stop associating with others and shun all society 
(Lex iuridica). (If you cannot help associating with others), enter into 
a society with them in which each can keep what is his  (suum cuique 
tribue).”84 
This second postulate indicates that the transition from the state of nature to 
civil society is based on the duty to create the conditions under which 
proprietary entitlements are fully rightful.85 Without a public authority entitled 
to make, apply, and enforce laws, a system of private right is morally 
incoherent, because “the conceptual requirements of private right—the 
security of possession, clear boundaries between “mine and thine,” and the 
acquisition of property—cannot be satisfied.”86 Integral to enjoyment of both 
the innate right to freedom and the private right to property is independence 
from external interference, which is possible only with the institution of public 
right to eradicate the problem of unilateral action that characterizes the state of 
nature.87 Even Kant’s suggestion that individuals may coerce one another to 
leave the state of nature88 expresses the mere fact that in the state of nature, 
                                                
83 Weinrib, “Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of Rights,” 807. 
84 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 392 (6:236-37). 
85 Weinrib, “Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of Rights,” 810. 
86 Ripstein, 23.  
87 Weinrib, “Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of Rights,” 810. 
88 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 416 (6:264). 
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where no rights are conclusive, individuals cannot rightly be prevented from 
exercising unilateral force. 
I therefore suggest that positive external freedom under public right is a social 
good, made possible only through reciprocity and cooperation when all agents 
sacrifice some of their freedom for the benefit of all.89 Since the concept of 
strict or juridical right is defined in relational terms,90 the idea of the united 
will shows how a conception of intelligible possession could be possible.91 
Intelligible possession implies that people could accumulate external things to 
the point of depriving others of what they need to exist.92 Each person would 
only cease to be the victim of the other’s exercise of freedom by giving up part 
of his own freedom (e.g. limiting his acquisition and use of external things to 
earn civil liberty or positive external freedom.93 No one could rightly be 
compelled to refrain from encroaching upon another’s freedom without a 
guarantee that the same kind of restraint will in equal measure be exercised 
with regard to him. Positive external freedom is therefore a social benefit that 
is critically dependent on the commitment of all agents to obedience.94 Such 
reciprocity requires a public legal framework to supersede the state of nature 
and the cooperative problems that characterize it.95  
                                                
89 Otfried Höffe, “The Dilemma of Natural Justice,” in Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy, 
edited by Howard Williams. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 133. 
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91 Ibid., 145. 
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Contrary to those who claim that the state merely provides assurance for 
private property rights,96 I argue that public right is not coextensive with 
private right. The claims of public right are fundamentally different, being 
“systemic claims citizens have only with regard to their own state.”97 The 
individual’s innate right to freedom entails the possibility of intelligible 
possession that, given the fact of mutual interdependence, requires an 
authoritative common will to constrain individuals to interact in ways that are 
collectively consistent with their innate freedom.98 This marks the transition 
from private to public property rights. Where the former was merely 
provisional, a public authority makes possible conclusive and enforceable 
property rights against others. What is determinately yours or mine is 
evidently not independent fact but “a socially dependent, variable, and 
negotiable boundary which exists by virtue of the mutual acknowledgment of 
both parties.”99 Therefore, public right is made possible only by a united 
people, and is greater than the sum of their individual private rights.  
This chapter has shown how the assumption of the innate human right to 
freedom begets the axiom that everyone is obliged to respect the external 
freedom of others. Furthermore, because human beings are both rational and 
material creatures, they may also acquire private rights to property. However, 
the finite nature of material reality and human sociability together generate the 
potential for conflict. This necessitates universal reciprocal coercion to 
preserve the equal external freedom of human beings. Such coercion is 
                                                
96 See James Penner, “The State Duty to Support the Poor in Kant's Doctrine of Right,” British 
Journal of Politics & International Relations 12, no. 1 (2010): 94-97. 
97 Varden, “A Kantian Conception of Global Justice,” 2054. 
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possible only in a civil condition under the public authority of the state. It is 
only when human beings unite to establish their public rights under the state’s 
authority that they can be equally secure in exercising their freedom. Where 
the poor are concerned, there is an important relation between public right and 
the state’s responsibility to relieve poverty within its borders. This will be the 
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3. Public Right and Poverty Relief 
By showing how innate and private right are merely provisional, the previous 
chapter demonstrates the significance of public right as a social good where all 
agents must cooperate to secure their equal freedom. Kant appeals to problems 
of assurance, indeterminacy and unilateral judgments in characterizing the 
state as a coercive mechanism that limits the individual freedom of its citizens 
to establish collective freedom under a civil rightful condition.100 Only the 
state can ensure public right by securing institutional conditions under which 
all citizens enjoy equal protection for their external freedom.101 The first part 
of this chapter discusses key features of the state in terms of its capacity to 
secure public right. This supports my argument in the second part for the 
state’s responsibility to relieve poverty, which threatens public right. 
In the Doctrine of Right, Kant argues that the state has a right to tax some 
citizens to protect others from poverty—conceived as a condition of utter 
dependence on the charity of others and an incapacity to exercise one’s right 
to freedom. The main problem with poverty is that it undermines its sufferers’ 
capacity for autonomy. An important consequence of this problem is that the 
poor could not freely consent to be subjected to the state’s coercive authority. 
Like Kant, I understand coercion to be legitimate when its subject could freely 
                                                
100 See Ripstein, 17. In contrast to Kant’s view that the state is integral to securing freedom in 
a collective setting, Neo-Kantians generally espouse the view that the state is merely 
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consent to it. The poor are not obliged to obey local laws to which they could 
not possibly consent, and the state cannot legitimately coerce them into doing 
so. As a result, the state’s coercive authority over the poor is illegitimate. 
Excluded from a public rightful condition, the poor are in a lawless state of 
nature and must resort to exercising their provisional private rights to defend 
themselves against others—including, in this context, the state and their fellow 
citizens. Public right, which depends on the united will and subjection of all 
citizens, is thus undermined by the poor’s entitlement to exercise private right. 
Consequently, even the wealthy cannot be secure in their property rights.  
The state is responsible for relieving poverty not simply because the poor have 
been deprived of their right to freedom and are suffering. Rather, it is because 
the poor are not bound to respect public right (a consequence of their loss of 
freedom) that the state is responsible for relieving poverty on account of the 
threat it poses to public right. Two conclusions can be drawn from my 
argument. First, the victims of poverty and rightful beneficiaries of relief are 
individuals, not states. Legitimate statehood is qualified by the protection of 
citizens from poverty and other threats to their innate right to freedom because 
such protection is a necessary precondition for public right, which the state is 
responsible for securing. Reduced to complete dependence on the private 
charity of others when they lack protection from the state, the poor are 
effectively excluded from and even threaten a public rightful condition. 
Second, the state is the primary agent responsible for poverty relief, which is 
critical to its role of representing its people’s united will and securing a public 
rightful condition for all. Together, these two points suggest that the poor are 
entitled to seek protection from poverty by appealing to the state for relief.  
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3.1 Enforcing Public Right 
The previous chapter has shown that justification for the state’s coercive 
powers is twofold: individuals seek security not only from the possibility that 
others may infringe on their freedom (negative external freedom), but also in 
enjoying equal protection for their rights to freedom (positive external 
freedom).102 In this section, I argue that for Kant, the state is best understood 
as an agent of its people’s united will. This interpretation of the state is based 
on the idea that coercive state authority cannot be justified as being merely 
instrumental to achieving particular ends (even if such an end is perfect 
justice). Rather than a powerful or benevolent source of universally 
advantageous rights, I suggest that the state is an agent through which the 
collective freedom of its citizens can be secured.103 This view of the state is 
illustrated by Kant’s idea of the original contract and supported by his 
emphasis on the importance of a republican state.  
To begin with, the state’s coercive authority is “a self-contained issue” that 
does not depend for its justification on external factors or potential 
consequences. 104  The state’s coercive system of equal freedom is non-
instrumental; it provides only the formal conditions for public right and does 
not represent any particular or material objectives. Kant rejects any ‘material’ 
principle of right which depends on the substantive ends that persons and 
states may have, since this can only generate material and conditional rules 
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which are neither necessary nor sufficient for the security of right.105 The 
instrumental view of the state assumes that it aims to attain some desirable 
outcome(s), which may in principle be achieved by some other means.106 For 
instance, to assert that the state’s role is to accumulate material wealth within 
a community is to also concede that the state is unnecessary, since material 
wealth may be accumulated through private savings and other means that do 
not require state action. The instrumental view faces “a special burden of 
justification,”107 because the state’s coercive authority over its people is 
theoretically unnecessary in achieving any particular aims. A stronger 
objection to the instrumental state is that the pursuit of particular purposes is 
tyrannical, since it represents an imposition of substantive purposes on all 
citizens, including those who have not chosen them.108 In this case, the state’s 
coercive authority violates the innate rights of citizens to freely set and pursue 
their own ends.  
In contrast to the instrumental view, I argue that the state is better understood 
as an agent through which the mutual sacrifice of various freedoms is 
precisely defined and delimited.109 The universal principle of right, which is 
that “[a]ny action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in 
accordance with a universal law,”110 implies that the state’s monopoly on 
                                                
105 Ibid., 13. 
106 Ibid., 9-10. 
107 Ibid., 9-10. 
108 A possible objection may be made in consideration of the possibility that all citizens 
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coercion is just only if it respects each citizen’s innate right to freedom. In 
other words, the state’s coercive authority is legitimate only if it could be 
consistent with each person’s entitlement to freely set and pursue his or her 
own ends.111 This suggests that the state’s lawmaking capacity is just that of 
its people giving laws to itself.112 Therefore, the state may only make laws that 
the people could possibly consent to and impose on themselves. It may not 
treat any person as a mere means, or limit his or her purposiveness for the 
pursuit of particular goals such as economic prosperity. No one could consent 
to the former since it involves giving up one’s freedom and personhood (and 
therefore also the capacity to consent to anything), while the latter involves the 
subjugation of a people’s freedom to particular purposes that are merely 
private, no matter how common or widely shared they happen to be.113 The 
state is entitled to act coercively only to reconcile the freedom and 
purposiveness of all citizens, and not to impose material and particular ends on 
them or violate any one of their rights. This is because the state’s coercive 
authority is justified not as a mere means for achieving independently 
desirable outcomes, but as an intrinsically necessary mechanism of public 
right.114  
Ultimately, the state and its people are mutually constitutive, since the former 
is an agent for and thereby also creates the people “as a moral subject to whom 
its acts can be imputed,”115 by vesting individual citizens with collective moral 
                                                
111 See Ripstein, x-xi. Ripstein describes this entitlement to freedom as the right to be one’s 
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agency. The state bases its legitimacy on the united will of its people, which is 
itself an idea of reason expressing a strictly formal condition for the exercise 
of state power: laws instituted by the state can only be made binding on the 
people if it could in principle be the object of agreement among them and 
consistent with their individual rights.116 Only autonomous, self-imposed laws 
could be legitimate, since the rational principle of non-contradiction demands 
that I obey only such laws—given my innate freedom, I cannot be bound by 
laws I could not freely will. Therefore, political freedom can be considered a 
necessary precondition for any legitimate system of laws.117 Furthermore, the 
state has no agency independent of the people, since all that it provides is a 
framework through which laws can be made, applied, and enforced by and for 
the people.118 Acts of the state can therefore be considered ‘public’ or ‘of the 
people’, insofar as they are exercised on behalf of the citizens considered as a 
single agent.”119  
Accordingly, the idea of the original contract—whereby individual citizens 
‘agree’120 to be bound by laws they give themselves as a people—represents 
the unifying principle and sole terms on which the legitimacy of the state, as a 
public institution, may be understood.121 The original contract is the ‘act’ by 
which a mere aggregation of individuals becomes a collective body under the 
state,122 although Kant explains that it need not be an actual historical event.123 
Instead, the original contract constitutes the normative framework under 
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which individuals may relinquish their “wild, lawless freedom in order to find 
[their] freedom as such undiminished in a dependence upon laws” that arise 
from their own lawgiving will.124 There are indeed significant difficulties in 
using actual or hypothetical (concerning ideal rational agents) consent as a 
criterion of justice.125 As a result, the contractual basis for the state is at best a 
purely formal criterion of justice, based on actual agents’ possible consent to 
the state’s constitution.126 In other words, the original contract is a purely 
formal idea of reason that endows private individuals with a public dimension, 
by enabling them to collectively make and submit to laws as a united people. 
Because the state is ultimately an instrument which channels and acts on the 
united will of the people, the legitimacy of its constitution depends on the 
possibility of universal consent from the people, which in turn requires the 
people to first be individually and collectively free.127 The state must regulate 
private right and secure each citizen’s freedom, equality and independence 
through institutions that sustain public rightful conditions under which 
individual freedoms can be governed by universal law.128 The state not only 
provides the normative framework under which its citizens can make and 
submit to laws as a single people, but also secures public right by enforcing 
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these public laws 129  to make determinate a binding framework of civil 
interactions.130 The state’s monopoly on coercion thus creates a dependency 
relation between the state and its citizens, where collective freedom and 
individual freedoms are mutually sustained. 
However, Kant also argued that because the self-seeking nature of human 
beings poses a challenge to the institution of public right, the people’s 
sovereignty is best represented and protected by a republican separation of 
powers. He explains that the united will consists of “three persons,” and there 
are likewise three authorities within the state: “the sovereign authority 
(sovereignty) in the person of the legislator; the executive authority in the 
person of the ruler (in conformity to law); and the judicial authority (to award 
to each what is his in accordance with the law) in the person of the judge.”131 
The republican state—characterized by the sharing of power between the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches—mitigates the problem of human 
selfishness by “arranging those forces of [human] nature in opposition to one 
another in such a way that one checks the destructive effect of the other or 
cancels it.”132 The republican constitution is therefore a mechanism by which 
citizens can be externally compelled as a united people to act in compliance 
with right.  
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The republican state ensures the authority of universal law through non-
contingent and symmetrical restrictions on the freedom of all citizens,133 thus 
enabling even a non-virtuous citizenry to govern itself according to the 
principle of right. 134  The republican separation of powers between the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches therefore completes the 
specification of independence between persons.135 While the innate right to 
freedom and the private right to property are merely provisional, human 
beings can finally be secure in these rights when they enjoy conclusive public 
right under a republican state. Furthermore, the state may legitimately speak 
and act for all citizens across time because the state’s agency represents that of 
its people as a collective unity. The state must therefore be regarded as 
existing in perpetuity 136  insofar as its representational form endures. 
Consequently, all citizens are bound to respect the state’s authority even when 
the specific compositions of the citizenry and the government change. In short, 
the state is a normative system of public right that is authoritative insofar as it 
provides the formal conditions for its citizens to act freely and cooperatively 
on their united will. 
 
3.2 The Right to Relief  
Given Kant’s conception of the state, the poor do not have a right to relief just 
because they might otherwise die. In the first place, private right protects each 
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person’s purposiveness only in terms of the things he or she already possesses 
and does not extend to things a person may need, even those necessary for 
survival.137 There is no duty of innate or private right to make one’s external 
things available for others to use,138 and others’ lack of external things (which 
they may want or need) is merely factual rather than intrinsically wrong.139 
Right has to do only with the relation of choice between individuals and 
considers neither wish nor need,140 which are inherently internal to their 
subject and do not have any external existence which could legally oblige 
another.141 There is no such thing as a right to private charity because each is 
entitled to set and determine the pursuit of his or her own ends, and does not 
wrong those in need by failing to help them. Persons suffering from poverty 
are therefore dependent on the charity of other private persons despite the lack 
of a private duty to rescue.142  
I contend that the state’s duty to support the poor can only be justified in terms 
of the state’s integral role in preserving a public rightful condition for its 
people.143 The minimum prerequisite for citizenship in the state is the capacity 
to partake in the original contract established by the united will of all. One can 
be a party to the contract only because one already possesses innate and 
private rights as a person, since these rights are subsequently vested—in 
conjunction with other individuals—in the state.144 Poverty in a civil condition 
negates this prerequisite of dignified personhood and presents the state with a 
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logical contradiction. The poor, whose basic survival is completely dependent 
on the discretionary choices of those who have more, are essentially bound to 
a contract that institutionalizes their loss of personhood. One could not 
possibly choose to bind oneself to a condition of dependence145 or to submit to 
an authority that entrenches one’s loss of freedom. As mentioned in the 
previous section, one must first be free before one can be a legitimate subject 
of the state’s coercive authority.146 The poor cannot then qualify as parties 
establishing the state; and the state’s coercive authority is no longer truly 
public or legitimate when exercised for purposes that the poor could not share. 
Excluded from a public rightful condition, the poor are forced to protect 
themselves by exercising their provisional private rights, but this is 
inconsistent with a public rightful condition. Poverty effectively renders the 
rich and poor incapable of sharing in a united will that is necessary for all to 
be bound by public right.147 Therefore, the state is required to support the poor 
in order to protect public right and secure the people’s collective freedom.148  
I argue that one specific duty of the state—as an institution of public right—is 
to guarantee all citizens unconditional relief from poverty, which undermines 
public right. Poverty deprives its sufferers of the capacity to exercise free 
choice, without which they could not possibly consent and be subjected to 
legitimate coercion under the state, and are therefore excluded from a public 
rightful condition. The poor are essentially deprived of the freedom that 
enables them to share in the united will that grounds the legitimacy of the 
state’s coercive authority. In this case, the incapacity to share in the united will 
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demonstrates poverty’s debilitating effects not only on individual freedom but 
also collective freedom under the state. Under these circumstances, the poor 
are not bound by the state’s laws, since the state is not for them a source of 
legitimate coercion. The poor are therefore in a state of nature in relation to 
the state and their fellow citizens, and are entitled to self-preservation by 
exercising their provisional private rights. This fundamentally threatens public 
right and collective freedom, which depend on the subjection of all citizens to 
universal reciprocal coercion. Ironically, even the wealthy cannot be secure in 
their property rights as long as the threat of poverty remains. Public right is 
jeopardized as long as any citizen (rich or poor) could find himself divested of 
the capacity for free choice, without any guaranteed public avenue for relief. 
Therefore, to preserve public right, I propose that the state must secure all 
citizens from the threat of poverty. Failure to do so would mean that the state 
and its coercive authority are not truly public and therefore illegitimate, since 
they serve only private interests (namely those of the wealthy, who have an 
interest in securing their property).  
Although my argument for relief is based on Kant’s ideas, I go further than he 
does. Kant does not defend a duty of the state to provide for the poor, even 
though he does support the state’s right to take resources from the wealthy.149 
The latter depends on the idea that the state is not a private party in relation to 
its citizens but an agent of their united will. Kant’s view contrasts with the 
Lockean one, in which ownership is a right based on causation, and the 
entitlement of persons to external things is based on their labor in creating or 
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acquiring these objects.150 Locke considers the state to be a private party in 
relation to its citizens, where the state has a causal role in producing all wealth 
and thus also absolute dominion over its assets and how they are to be 
disposed of.151 However, for Kant, persons are entitled to external objects as 
instruments for exercising their innate freedom, simply by being the first to 
take these into their own possession and subsequently obliging all others to 
refrain from using them.152 Each person is a private party with the innate 
human right to freedom and the private right to property, yet these rights are 
merely provisional and become conclusive only under a public rightful 
condition. The state provides security for individual rights in a collective 
setting, where the “general will of the people has united itself into a society 
which is to maintain itself perpetually; and for this end it has submitted itself 
to the internal authority of the state in order to maintain those members of the 
society who are unable to maintain themselves.”153  
The collective dimension of the state’s public authority may explain how the 
state can take from the wealthy and give to the poor without wronging the 
former, but it does not explain how the state can justifiably choose to do so. 
This justificatory gap in Kant’s arguments is especially pronounced in view of 
his emphatic claim that the state has no duty of beneficence or benevolence to 
its citizens. Kant maintains that the state’s sole duty is to ensure public rightful 
relations between free individuals, and “a paternalistic government… is the 
greatest despotism thinkable” because it imposes on citizens the particular 
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(private) end of happiness.154 The independence of Kant’s arguments for 
poverty relief from material considerations ultimately rests on the distinction 
he makes between right and virtue.155 Since right concerns only the relation of 
choice between persons, actions that cause harm or fail to confer a benefit on 
another person may affect that person’s means, but such actions are not 
inherently wrong because they do not interfere with his or her freedom to 
determine how these means are to be used. For example, contributing to 
Napoleon’s college fund enhances the means at his disposal to pursue his 
academic goals, but this has no effect on his capacity to decide what to do 
with these means. Kant does not consider material inequality in itself a 
concern for the state, so this raises the question of how he can justify poverty 
relief as a relevant concern for the state even if he can justify taxing the 
wealthy for these purposes. 
Despite Kant’s lack of development on this question, his vehement rejection 
of welfare or happiness as a ground for state legislation does not necessitate a 
libertarian conception of the state. In fact, I argue that Kant’s ideas are 
hospitable to considerations of socio-economic inequality, but only because 
such inequality threatens public right. 156  Specifically, the state’s role in 
securing public right is fully consistent with and even necessitates a well-
developed framework of social welfare (albeit not for the sake of welfare 
itself).157 The state may concern itself only with legal equality among citizens 
                                                
154 Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 290-91 (8:290–91); see also Allen Wood, Kantian Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 194. 
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but,158 in practice, legal and material equality are not mutually exclusive. Kant 
requires that right regulate external acts but not the choice of ends. This 
implies that the state may not adopt legislation that imposes particular ends on 
the people, although it may adopt legislation that merely regulates external 
acts and are incidentally designed to realize ends.159 Much of the literature on 
Kant’s ideas concerning poverty focuses too narrowly either on the structural 
preservation of public right or on poverty and welfare as material concerns, 
and many scholars have failed to recognize that these are not mutually 
exclusive.160 The key factor relating these concerns is the simultaneously 
intelligible and material nature of human beings. Persons require adequate 
resources to exercise their capacity for external freedom, without which they 
cannot be free parties to a public rightful condition.161 Because security from 
poverty is necessary to preserve the united will that establishes public right, 
the state’s duty to preserve public right manifests as a duty of relief—a duty of 
justice which is conceptually distinct from but has the same practical effects as 
an ethical duty of beneficence.162 
Libertarian Kantians interpret the state’s duty to its citizens “solely as a duty 
to prevent force and fraud,” but other kinds of Kantians argue that “these 
duties are flexible, sensitive to circumstance and concerned with the 
fundamentals prerequisite to citizenship and agency.”163 It is true that “social 
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contract reasoning” and the state’s role in preserving public right never justify 
any particular positive laws such as taxing the wealthy to support the poor.164 
However, I argue that while the state’s duty to its citizens is solely to preserve 
a coercive system of public right, fulfilling this duty incidentally necessitates 
meeting the material conditions under which all citizens could freely consent 
and subject themselves to the state’s authority.  
In the first place, citizens may be unequal in various ways, yet all are equal as 
subjects of the state. Kant distinguishes between active and passive citizens, 
where the latter includes women and servants, and only the former has 
political freedom and voting rights based on their property qualifications.165 
However, he also maintains that all citizens (‘the people’) are nevertheless 
entitled to civil rights, freedom and legal equality as human beings. This 
equality implies that “no one of them can coerce any other except through 
public law (and its executor, the head of state), through which every other also 
resists him in like measure.”166 More importantly, no one can lose this 
authoritative right against others except by his own crime;” he cannot choose 
to rescind it “by a contract, and so bring it about by a rightful action that he 
has no rights but only duties; for he would thereby deprive himself of the right 
to make a contract and thus the contract would nullify itself.”167 The social 
contract therefore serves as a formal test of unjust laws; a contract which 
deprives some individuals of their rights is something that an entire people 
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could not agree to because it would contradict the right to freedom of those 
who would thereby be disadvantaged.168  
Consequently, the state is responsible for relieving poverty because the state is 
not merely unjust but effectively illegitimate when it fails to provide for the 
poor. Because the poor lack autonomy and could not possibly consent to the 
social contract establishing the state, they are neither protected nor bound by 
the obligations of public right.169 As a result, the poor can and must resort to 
exercising their private individual rights to preserve themselves, even if this 
violates public right. This means that even the wealthy can only be secure in 
their property rights when the rights of all citizens are protected. The wealthy 
and poor alike thus depend on the state to protect their rights,170 and poverty 
relief is essential to the state’s role of preserving public right as a mechanism 
of social cooperation and universal reciprocal coercion. Without 
institutionalizing and guaranteeing unconditional poverty relief for all citizens, 
the state is not legitimate and political obligations do not exist.171 
Evidently, the state’s duty of relief is not a matter of benevolence, charity, or 
virtue, but an obligation of the state to secure justice for all citizens as free and 
equal members of a just society.172 Kant opposes paternalism, happiness and 
welfare as valid principles of legislation.173 The provision of welfare could not 
in itself be a duty for the state because like illness, “poverty is a misfortune 
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which one may bemoan but not rightfully protest.”174 The state’s duty is 
primarily to secure public right, so it cannot be held responsible for relieving 
poverty on the basis of individual suffering alone. 175  Kant’s claim that 
inequality of wealth is consequent upon the injustice of the government 
suggests that the state is responsible for preventing or remedying general 
injustice,176 but this claim does not depend on a conception of poverty as a 
standalone problem of suffering or inequality. The state has no business 
regulating economic inequality for the mere sake of its people’s welfare or 
happiness, although it must do so to ensure that all citizens have adequate 
resources to lead free and independent lives.  
Rather than welfare or happiness, the public duty to support the poor is 
premised on the idea that the material aspect of human nature necessitates 
adequate material resources for one to exercise free choice, as a prerequisite 
for participation in a public rightful condition.177 Poverty relief guarantees all 
citizens a right to exist and survive somewhere, and is necessary in ensuring 
that they are subject only to the laws of the state and receive adequate 
representation under its institutional framework.178 Insofar as the state has 
adopted the task of protecting the people’s rights, it must intervene to 
eliminate oppressive economic conditions in order to preserve public right for 
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all.179 Because the equal external freedom of individual citizens is necessary to 
realize a rightful civil condition, 180  the state must ensure that empirical 
conditions are not hostile to equality of freedom.181 Poverty relief is not merely 
ideal182 but necessary to preserve the institutional conditions of equal systemic 
freedom that must be met before political obligations can exist under public 
right and be secured by the state’s coercive authority. 
I argue that as a result, the state’s ‘minimal’ duty to secure a public rightful 
condition must entail unconditional provision at the level of its citizens’ most 
necessary natural needs. Kant’s focus on “most necessary natural needs”183 
seems vague; it neither specifies the level of social provision, nor limits 
redistribution to what is necessary for biological survival. 184  Yet, this 
expresses Kant’s recognition of the fact that poverty itself is not inconsistent 
with the rule of law, and that his arguments for relief as a matter of justice are 
of a formal and procedural rather than substantive nature.185 Neither economic 
inequality nor the individual’s need for subsistence is an independent concern 
for the state as an institution of justice,186 although issues of economic justice 
and political legitimacy are inextricably related.187 On the one hand, Kant’s 
concern is solely to make possible a rightful condition, therefore he specifies 
only that provision to the poor is required at the level which preserves their 
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independence,188 and cautions against “burdening the people with unnecessary 
costs.”189 On the other hand, as long as any citizen (even one who is presently 
wealthy) could find himself impoverished with no public means of support,190 
his freedom is threatened by the possibility of dependence on the charity of 
private persons who are not obliged to help him. This is why the state’s 
responsibility to relieve poverty must be unconditional: the state’s role in 
securing public right implies that it must guarantee equal systemic freedom, 
which necessitates unconditional poverty relief to ensure that all citizens have 
the minimum resources required to preserve their independence. Although 
many states make their anti-poverty policies conditional, my argument shows 
how this cannot be consistent with the state’s role in securing public right. 
To reiterate my argument, poverty relief is necessary for the preservation of 
public right because individuals need material resources in order to exercise 
their freedom, without which they could not be legitimate parties to and 
subjects under a rightful condition. Since the poor are essentially in a state of 
nature in relation to the people, they have no political obligations and cannot 
rightly be coerced to respect public laws. Even the mere possibility of poverty 
threatens public right because its sufferers are entitled to exercise private right 
against the people. However, the poor cannot be considered dependents of the 
state, nor does the state ‘owe’ them relief or welfare.191 Rather, the state 
requires for its own preservation the freedom of all citizens from poverty, 
which jeopardizes the collective social cooperation necessary for public right 
to operate.  
                                                
188 Ripstein, 284-85. 
189 Baiasu, 7. 
190 Holtman, 103. 
191 Weinrib, “Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of Rights,” 817. 
     43 
 
If the state’s duty to support the poor is a matter of preserving public right, 
then this explains why Kant maintains that the state cannot do so by relying on 
voluntary contributions or assets accumulated by religious and other private 
institutions.192 The state may not rely on private resources to support the poor, 
since these fail to address poverty as a public problem.193 Poverty, which 
manifests as private dependence, is ultimately a public problem because it is 
institutionalized under the state and its creation of enforceable property rights. 
The state must secure relief for its citizens through public taxation rather than 
voluntary contributions,194 since only the former constitutes an institutional 
solution to poverty that addresses it as an institutional problem that affects the 
capacity of citizens to participate in public right.195 As mentioned, private 
right does not entitle one to means that are not already in one’s possession, 
and there is no private obligation to support the poor except for the 
unenforceable duty of virtue to treat others’ needs as one’s own ends.196 
Voluntary private contributions are permissible and valuable, but these are 
separate from the state’s relief efforts, which are distinctively public and 
coercive in nature. 
Kant justifies coercive public taxation197 to support the poor as a right of the 
state against the people.198 The government is authorized to tax the wealthy to 
provide for the poor, because the wealthy owe the security and enjoyment of 
their rights (to their own persons, material resources, etc.) to the protection of 
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the state, and are therefore obliged to support the state’s duty to relieve fellow 
citizens.199 Taxation is not justified as the imposition of limits on the right to 
pursue one’s own ends.200 Rather, it supports the freedom of taxpayers—
whose acquisition and enjoyment of exclusive property rights must be 
authorized through public procedures that can be accepted by all—to ensure 
that their claim to exclude the poor from their property is not a unilateral 
imposition of force.201 Taxing the wealthy to provide for the poor is just 
because it ensures that each is equal in her rights as a citizen, and that laws are 
mutually consistent in applying to all without needing to make equal demands 
on each citizen.202 This is why the state must depend solely on public taxation 
“in such a way that the people taxes itself,” and “the only way of proceeding 
in accordance with principles of right in this matter is for taxes to be levied by 
those deputized by the people.”203  
Ultimately, the state’s duty to support the poor is a consequence of the 
obligatory movement from provisional right in the state of nature to public 
right under a civil condition, where the public institution of property rights is 
legitimate only when the poor are guaranteed relief.204 Unconditional poverty 
relief is a necessary element of the state’s duty to secure public right for its 
citizens, and the effect of welfare is merely incidental.205 Since as private 
rights these measures would amount to the right to enslave others,206 my 
interpretation of poverty relief exemplifies the idea that the state, as an 
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institution of public right, is greater than the sum of its citizens’ individual 
private rights. Even though I have supported Kant’s justification for the state’s 
duty of relief to the poor, states can and do fail to fulfill this duty. Given that 
the rightful beneficiaries of relief are individuals, not states, and that states 
have an enforceable right to tax the wealthy to relieve the poor within its 
borders, the next two chapters discuss further prospects for a duty of relief 














     46 
 
4. International Right 
Whether a state chooses not to provide relief or is simply incapable of 
providing it, the poor are excluded from a rightful condition. When the poor 
cannot be secure in their individual rights, this in turn undermines the state’s 
capacity to secure public right for all citizens. The poor may seek to exit the 
state of nature by appealing to the state to protect their right to independence, 
or by forming or joining a separate legitimate state that provides such 
protection. The former may be ruled out when the state consistently fails to 
provide for its citizens’ “most necessary natural needs”207 and protect their 
rights. Although the state has a duty to relieve the poor, and an enforceable 
right to tax the wealthy for these purposes, it cannot be coerced into doing so. 
Despite the state’s substantial duties of justice to its citizens, the latter may not 
forcibly demand that the state fulfill these duties. 208  The ‘external’ 
unenforceability of relief is perhaps why some scholars wrongly attribute an 
“ethical norm-giving” status to the duty of relief209 and misconstrue it as a 
duty of beneficence.210 There is no reason to suppose that Kant believed 
freedom, equality, independence or justice could be perfectly realized by 
actual citizens or societies, especially given his arguments for striving toward 
cosmopolitan society.211 Although Kant does not address poverty relief in 
situations where states simply do not provide relief for their poverty-stricken 
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citizens, or in the supranational212 context, I aim to demonstrate that it is 
possible to extend or replicate key elements of Kant’s argument for domestic 
poverty relief in these settings.  
Kant’s discussion of right at the supranational level focuses on the rights of 
one state against another and on cosmopolitan right. There are (at least) two 
senses in which Kant uses the expression ‘cosmopolitan right’. The first is 
formal and refers to universal right at the supranational level, whereas the 
second is substantive and refers specifically to the right to hospitality in terms 
of private-public relations across state boundaries (e.g. relations between state 
A and citizens of state B). These differences appear to be theoretically 
consistent in Kant’s writings.213 In this chapter, I focus on the formal sense of 
cosmopolitan right in determining the nature of and conceptual limitations to 
right at the supranational level. I examine the prospects for supranational right, 
and argue that right outside the domestic context is unenforceable and 
therefore merely provisional in the absence of a coercive international order. 
A unique challenge to the institution of international public right is that there 
are both individual and state agents to account for.214 States are fundamentally 
unlike individuals in that they are defined by domestic public rightful 
conditions and cannot simply subject themselves to external institutions of 
public right, which could potentially conflict with their duty to secure their 
peoples’ rights.215 This means that public right at the domestic level is an 
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obstacle to the institution of public right at the supranational level. 
Consequently, the argument for enforceable domestic poverty relief—by 
means of redistribution from the rich to the poor—does not have an equivalent 
analogy at the supranational level.  
This sets up the following chapter’s discussion of the cosmopolitan right to 
hospitality and its implications on the issue of poverty, where I argue that 
poverty relief at the supranational level can nevertheless be justified in terms 
of provisional right. Kant’s discussion of these two senses of cosmopolitan 
right is not directly relevant to the challenge of protecting the poor, who are 
essentially ‘stateless’ to the degree that they are excluded from a rightful 
condition. Although states have no obligation (whether enforceable or 
unenforceable) of right to redistribute resources to impoverished foreigners, 
the cosmopolitan right to hospitality suggests that states can turn visitors away 
only if they have a rightful condition to return to. Therefore, I argue that states 
must welcome economic refugees—who have no rightful condition to return 
to and would otherwise be destroyed in the state of nature216—as long as these 
persons are willing to abide by local laws. My argument is limited to 
economic refugees understood in this sense as persons who do not enjoy 
protection under a civil rightful condition. The poor may therefore seek refuge 
in a foreign state, where they are entitled to temporary protection from the 
state of nature and have the possibility of gaining citizenship and entering a 
civil rightful condition.  
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I first examine the prospects for enforceable rights outside the domestic state 
by analyzing Kant’s discussion of international right and evaluating the 
plausibility of an international or universal rightful condition. Rights at the 
supranational level remain merely provisional until there is “a universal 
association of states (analogous to that by which a people becomes a state)” 
with organizational and coercive structures like those of the state, under which 
public international rights can come to hold conclusively.217 States are in a 
condition of nature and lack enforceable obligations to one another in the 
absence of an overarching sovereign. Although Kant doubts that a universal or 
world state could secure those rights because governing and protecting each 
member would be impossible over such vast regions, 218  he also rejects 
multiple super-states on the basis that these “would again bring on a state of 
war.”219 Ultimately, I argue that a universal state or international super-state is 
conceptually impossible. A national state—whose fundamental role is to 
secure a public rightful condition for its citizens—cannot justifiably entrust 
the security of its people to a universal state. A universal state, whose primary 
role is to secure public right for the universal community, could not prioritize 
the rights of a single people in the same way that a national state could. A 
national state also cannot subject itself to a sovereign international super-state 
that could exercise its authority in ways that conflict with a particular nation’s 
rights. This implies that public right in the supranational context is 
theoretically impossible, and any cross-border duty or right to relief is at best 
provisional. 
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4.1 Why Do We Need Rights Beyond the State? 
Kant identifies two conditions under which there is a rational need for some 
form of supranational right. First, because the earth’s geographical space is 
finite, human beings must live in proximity with one another. Second, such 
proximity makes interactions between people inevitable and increases the 
chances for conflict between them. Kant states that human beings have “the 
right of possession in common of the earth's surface on which, as a sphere, 
they cannot disperse infinitely but must finally put up with being near one 
another.”220 If the earth’s surface were infinite, everyone could claim as much 
land as they wanted. If land were infinitely abundant, everyone’s territorial 
claims would be unconditionally compatible (i.e. compatible regardless of the 
magnitude of these claims). However, because the earth’s space is finite and 
scarce, territorial claims are accompanied by the risk of conflict since 
individuals and states may stake contradictory claims. Spatiotemporal 
constraints therefore imply that the right to external objects consists in a 
relation between subjects, where finite empirical reality sets the limits within 
which human beings are constrained to establish rightful relations.221 This is a 
zero-sum game where any territorial claim—no matter how small—would 
necessarily reduce the amount of territory for others to claim.  
Natural law theorists such as Grotius argue that division is necessary before 
ownership is possible, because God first gave the land to humankind in 
common. In contrast, Kant reasons from the fact of individual acquisition to 
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the idea of original possession in common. 222  Human beings possess a 
collective right to possession of the earth,223 because they are equally entitled 
to occupy space on the earth and potentially affect one another when it comes 
to occupying physical space. They are forced to interact and share the limited 
physical space available on the earth224 because the occupancy of space is 
exclusive. In the absence of a rightful condition, the interaction between 
persons would take place in the state of nature, which is characterized by the 
constant threat of war and conflict. Like human beings, states are—by virtue 
of their moral personality—also in a condition of nature with respect to one 
another.225 States in this condition of juridical lawlessness and war “already 
wrong one another by being near one another”226 and are therefore obliged to 
leave this condition of natural freedom.227 To willingly be or remain in such a 
condition is “wrong in the highest degree”228 because this contradicts the 
possibility of being governed by right, thereby denying the validity of the 
principle of right and subverting the innate human right to freedom.229 States 
are therefore obliged to leave the condition of nature and organize themselves 
in accordance with the idea of the original contract.230  
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Evidently, public right—“the sum of the laws which need to be promulgated 
generally in order to bring about a rightful condition”—serves an important 
role at various levels.231 Constituting the legal framework which supports a 
rightful condition, public right is “a system of laws for a people, that is, a 
multitude of human beings, or for a multitude of peoples, which, because they 
affect one another, need a rightful condition under a will uniting them, a 
constitution,” so that all may enjoy what has been established as right.232 
Considering that agents (whether individuals or states) affect one another, the 
institution of public right is critical to a rightful condition at three different 
levels: the state, relations between states, and states as members of a larger 
confederation.  
The first involves individuals living under the coercive authority of a state. 
“This condition of the individuals within a people in relation to one another is 
called a civil condition (status civilis), and the whole of individuals in a 
rightful condition, in relation to its own members is called a state (civitas).”233 
This civil condition comes about when individuals submit to the coercive 
authority of a state, which makes possible a rightful condition. The state is 
endowed with moral personality, conceived in terms of the collective agency 
of its citizens; since the duty and role of the state is to represent the united will 
of its people. The ‘right of a state’ therefore refers to civil order and public 
right between citizens who live together in a civil condition under the coercive 
authority of the state. The state’s actions can also be considered expressions of 
the right of a state where the state acts on the united will of its citizens. The 
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right of a state encompasses territorial integrity and security, as well as 
political and cultural self-determination.”234  
The state provides a domestic rightful condition for its people, but in relation 
to other states it is in a condition of nature. In this context, the ‘right of 
nations’ or the ‘right of states’ (the term Kant considers to be more accurate235) 
refers to the right of states to engage one another on the basis of commonly 
agreed regulations.236 The right of states is the second form of public right, 
which governs relations between states according to rules of inter-state 
conduct. When expressed as positive law, the basis of these rules is the treaties 
or customs to which states consent, whether tacitly or expressly, to submit. 
The content of these rules “consist… partly of their right to go to war, partly 
of their right in war, and partly of their right to constrain each other to leave 
this condition of war and so form a constitution that will establish lasting 
peace,” or “right after war.”237 The right of states does not exclude the right to 
resort to unilateral force; there is no overarching enforcement authority to 
secure the rights of all, therefore each is entitled to secure them for itself.238 
In contrast to the right of states, public right at the third level is conclusive 
because it is enforceable under the authority of a supranational sovereign. 
Kant explains that since “the earth's surface is not unlimited but closed, the 
concepts of the right of a state and of a right of nations lead inevitably to the 
idea of a right for a state of nations (ius gentium) or cosmopolitan right (ius 
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cosmopoliticum).”239 The need to share physical space on the earth and the 
accompanying threat of conflict can be fully mitigated only by an overarching 
sovereign with the authority to make and enforce judgments on conflicting 
claims. States finally leave the condition of nature when they create and enter 
an association of states “analogous to that by which a people becomes a state;” 
this establishes conclusive international “right for a state of nations or 
cosmopolitan right” and genuine peace at the supranational level.240 Under this 
international rightful condition, violations of right—which Kant considers to 
be the main cause of conflict—would no longer be condoned. Only then 
would states be able to enjoy conclusive public right under a sovereign super-
state. 
In each of these cases, public right provides the necessary legal framework to 
limit each agent’s external freedom so that all may enjoy their respective 
rights. Kant also makes the conceptual claim that “if the principle of outer 
freedom limited by law is lacking in any one of these three possible forms of 
rightful condition, the framework of all the others is unavoidably undermined 
and must finally collapse.” 241  In other words, these different possible 
configurations of public right do not operate independently of one another.242 
Public right can be truly conclusive only when it is instituted on a universal 
scale. Even though I am secure in my property under domestic public law, 
foreign parties may nevertheless destroy and deprive me of my property. This 
is why Kant argues that a universal state of states, each with its own domestic 
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rightful condition and all maintaining rightful relations with one another, is 
not merely prudent but exemplifies justice.243 Global justice is not simply an 
extension of domestic justice, since the latter is not complete without the 
former. The ultimate scope of public right is universal, therefore rightful 
interaction between persons requires both domestic and global public 
authorities.244 
Even with this observation, it seems odd for Kant to make a distinction 
between the second and third types (the right of states and the right for a state 
of nations or formal cosmopolitan right, respectively) of possible rightful 
condition. Both involve states, and it is not clear how the second type even 
qualifies as a rightful condition, since the right of states is at best provisional 
in the absence of an overarching authority. Kant says that a right of states is 
possible only where “a rightful condition already exists,” without which “there 
is no public right” and “any right that one may think of outside it (in a state of 
nature) is instead merely private right.”245 This means that for relations 
between states to be governed by the right of states, there must first be 
conclusive public right between them. Yet, the existence of a supranational 
authority would generate right for a state of nations or cosmopolitan right, 
which is simply the third kind of public right. It is puzzling how the right of 
states could exist in the absence of a supranational sovereign authority, and 
how an authority that preserves the right of states would be conceptually 
distinct from the sovereign authority of an international super-state that 
preserves right for a state of nations or cosmopolitan right. 
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However, this distinction may be understood in light of the limitations in the 
analogy between individuals and states in a condition of nature. Like 
individuals, states in a condition of nature enjoy provisional rights, although 
states face a more complex situation. The “only difference between the state of 
nature of individual human beings and of families (in relation to one another) 
and that of [states] is that in the right of [states] we have to take into 
consideration not only the relation of one state toward another as a whole, but 
also the relation of individual persons of one state toward the individuals of 
another, as well as toward another state as a whole.”246 The solution to a state 
of nature between individuals—the institution of a sovereign state authority—
is relatively straightforward, since only individual-to-individual relations need 
to be taken into account. Conversely, seeking a solution to a condition of 
nature between states is more complicated, since it must account for three 
different kinds of relations: state-to-state, individual-to-state, and individual-
to-individual.  
This complexity poses an additional challenge to the institution of a 
supranational rightful condition because of the tension it generates between 
right within and right beyond the civil condition. Kant explains that states 
“already have a rightful constitution internally and hence have outgrown the 
constraint of others to bring them under a more extended law-governed 
constitution in accordance with their concepts of right.”247 Assuming that 
states effectively preserve a public rightful condition for their citizens, a 
state’s actions at the international level are legitimate expressions of its 
people’s united will. For instance, a declaration of war by a state is consistent 
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with the sovereign’s duty to the citizens when the citizens are “regarded as 
co[-]legislating members of a state (not merely as means, but also as ends in 
themselves), [who] must therefore give their free assent, through their 
representatives, not only to waging war in general but also to each particular 
declaration of war.”248 The state’s representation of its citizens’ united will 
makes declarations of war legitimate, and more broadly illustrates how 
foundational consent is to legitimate coercion. In general—and this is 
especially apparent in declarations of war, which costs are borne by the 
citizens—the right of a state can be understood in terms of the sovereign’s 
duty to represent its people’s united will. When all citizens share in the united 
will that is expressed through the state’s actions, individual-to-individual and 
individual-to-state relations are rightful. The right of a state is therefore 
defined in terms of rightful relations between individuals and the state to 
which authority they consent and submit.  
However, the same actions that exemplify the right of a state are merely 
unilateral in the context of state-to-state relations, where public right is absent 
at the international level. Stating that “this difference [in the rights of states] 
from the rights of individuals in a state of nature makes it necessary to 
consider only such features as can be readily inferred from the concept of a 
state of nature,”249 Kant suggests that right between states will inevitably be 
more limited. Leaving a state of nature between individuals requires the 
institution of laws to govern individual-to-individual relations, which also 
generates and is compatible with rightful individual-to-state relations under a 
legitimate state authority. However, states face an insurmountable tension 
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between individual-to-state and state-to-state relations in attempting to leave 
an international state of nature. At the international level, public right between 
states can be conclusive only when there is a supranational sovereign to 
enforce it, and this generates rightful state-to-state relations. Because states 
can reasonably disagree, securing a rightful peace requires an international 
authority to specify and apply the laws governing interactions between 
them.250 Conversely, choosing to remain in the state of nature is equivalent to 
abrogating all right. In this case, nothing could be considered unjust, even the 
act of compelling other states to enter civil society under a state of nations.251 
Yet, a supranational sovereign authority entails that each state is bound to act 
on the united will of its citizens (for individual-to-individual and individual-
to-state relations to be rightful), as well as the orders of the supranational 
sovereign (for state-to-state relations to be rightful). This presents a potential 
conflict of duties that the state—whose fundamental duty is to secure public 
right for its own people—must avoid at all costs.  
 
4.2 The Conceptual Impossibility of a Supranational Sovereign 
Kant’s objections to pursuing universal peace via a universal state or multiple 
super-states are, respectively, empirical and conceptual in nature. However, I 
argue that these objections are most compelling when interpreted in terms of a 
common conceptual basis: national states would face a potential conflict 
between duties to their peoples and to a supranational sovereign. Two ways in 
which this conflict of duties could manifest are the emergence of a tyrannical 
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universal state or war between multiple super-states. Kant claims that if “a 
state made up of nations were to extend too far over vast regions, governing it 
and so too protecting each of its members would finally have to become 
impossible, while several such corporations would again bring on a state of 
war.”252 Kant’s empirical claim that a universal super-state would not be able 
to secure the rights of the multitude of its members is arguably outdated.253 He 
makes a separate conceptual claim that multiple international super-states 
would also be unable to secure their members from the threat of conflict, 
thereby also failing to protect their members’ rights. Yet, both claims can be 
understood in terms of a single theoretical argument. The conflict of duties 
faced by states to their citizens and to any kind of supranational sovereign 
authority is a valid conceptual objection to the institution of a super-state, 
regardless of its scale (international union of some or all states) or type 
(universal or international super-state).  
Kant dismisses the option of a universal state in pursuing universal peace on 
the claim that it would threaten rather than protect its members’ rights. He 
states that 
The idea of the right of nations presupposes the separation of many 
neighboring states independent of one another; and although such a 
condition is of itself a condition of war (unless a federative union of 
them prevents the outbreak of hostilities), this is nevertheless better, 
in accordance with the idea of reason, than the fusion of them by one 
power overgrowing the rest and passing into a universal monarchy, 
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since as the range of government expands laws progressively lose 
their vigor, and a soulless despotism, after it has destroyed the seed 
of good, finally deteriorates into anarchy.254  
For instance, a tyrannical universal state could violate the rights of its 
citizens255 by enslaving some of them for manpower required in developing 
rural territories. More generally, there is the danger that the rights of all would 
be further compromised if the conflicts that were previously matters of foreign 
policy became the domestic conflicts of a world state and were decided by a 
majority on the basis of their self-interest.256 However, there are stronger 
theoretical grounds for rejecting a universal state apart from the possibility of 
tyranny. Each national state is responsible for protecting the specific rights 
and interests of its own people, and cannot justifiably confer this responsibility 
on a universal sovereign. A universal state’s prime responsibility is to the 
universal community, so it could not prioritize the rights of a specific group of 
citizens in the same way that a national state prioritizes its own people’s 
rights. Therefore, by allowing its citizens to become subjects of a universal 
state instead, the national state would be contravening its fundamental duty to 
represent its people’s united will and to secure their collective rights. 
Even the contention that world citizenship complements rather than dissolves 
national citizenship—where, for instance, an individual could have national, 
regional and global citizenship under a federal world republic—does not 
resolve this tension. 257  Sovereignty can indeed be conceptualized on a 
spectrum, and a federal world state does provide an intermediate stage 
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between a voluntary congress and a universal state,258 but a sovereign national 
state still cannot subject itself to a supranational authority. Kant’s rejection of 
a supranational sovereign is not based on a merely empirical argument.259 I 
argue that his system of right supports a conceptual argument against any 
sovereign super-state: the internal sovereignty and external subordination of 
states subjects the concept of sovereignty to tension in the domestic and 
international contexts. Kant explains that a federal republic of states  
Would be a contradiction, inasmuch as every state involves the 
relation of a superior (legislating) to an inferior (obeying, namely the 
people); but a number of nations within one state would constitute 
only one nation, and this contradicts the presupposition (since here 
we have to consider the right of nations in relation to one another 
insofar as they comprise different states and are not to be fused into a 
single state).260  
This reveals the logical incompatibility between internal sovereignty and 
external subordination. The latter is necessary for states’ rights to be 
conclusive under right for a state of nations, but this would necessarily be at 
the expense of the former. The state is bound to act in accordance with the 
united will of its people,261 and if the state is subject to an overarching 
sovereign authority, then it is also bound to act in accordance with the 
demands of this overarching sovereign, which could potentially contradict the 
sovereign will of its people.  
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The right of a state to represent the united will of its citizens is essentially a 
double-edged sword. It protects public right in the domestic context of 
individual-to-individual and individual-to-state relations, but is also an 
obstacle to instituting a supranational sovereign authority under which 
international (state-to-state) rightful relations can finally be conclusive.262 
Therefore, the “Kantian paradox is that it is wrong for states to remain in the 
state of nature but at the same time impossible for them to escape it so long as 
they remain independent states.”263 Since the state’s primary duty is to secure 
the rights of its citizens, its moral personality is dependent on their moral 
personality and autonomy. The state could not justifiably choose to limit its 
people’s sovereignty by subjecting itself to an overarching authority, 
especially since such an authority could potentially contravene its people’s 
rights. Failure to protect its citizens’ rights would destroy the state’s own 
moral personality and its right to equality and freedom under principles of 
international law. 264  States cannot subject themselves to a supranational 
sovereign, thus “rejecting in hypothesi what is correct in thesi”265 the only 
means of securing universal public right, because this jeopardizes their 
peoples’ rights and consequently also their own moral personalities.  
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Ironically, Kant’s republicanism rules out the establishment of a coercive 
world state while supporting the feasibility of a strong international 
federation. 266  The conditions of the international state of nature are so 
deplorable that states are faced with the need to seek alternative ways of 
leaving it, short of instituting conclusive international public right under an 
overarching sovereign authority. Although the preliminary articles of 
Perpetual Peace do not prohibit war, Kant states that “Reason, from the 
throne of the highest morally legislative power, delivers an absolute 
condemnation of war as a procedure for determining rights and, on the 
contrary, makes a condition of peace, which cannot be instituted or assured 
without a pact of nations among themselves, a direct duty; so there must be a 
league of a special kind, which can be called a pacific league (foedus 
pacificum)… [that] seeks to end all war forever.” 267  A public rightful 
condition under a universal state or international super-state may then be 
considered an impractical ideal, which Kant suggests approximating via a 
limited rightful condition under a voluntary federation and a right of states 
based on common agreement.  
A league of nations in accordance with the idea of an original social 
contract is necessary, not in order to meddle in one another's internal 
dissensions but to protect against attacks from without… This 
alliance must, however, involve no sovereign authority (as in a civil 
constitution), but only an association (federation); it must be an 
alliance that can be renounced at any time and so must be renewed 
from time to time. This is a right in subsidium of another and original 
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right, to avoid getting involved in a state of actual war among the 
other members (foedus Amphictyonum).268 
The significance of Kant’s emphasis on the necessity of a federation of nations 
is apparent in the tension between conclusive right under a civil condition and 
provisional right in the interstate condition of nature. States’ obligations to 
protect the interests of their citizens present an obstacle to instituting an 
international super-state for conclusive universal peace. As a compromise, 
states can retain complete sovereignty269 as partners in a pacific federation in 
the form of “a voluntary coalition of different states which can be dissolved at 
any time, not a federation (like that of the American states) which is based on 
a constitution and can therefore not be dissolved.”270 This compromise reflects 
the imperfect analogy between individuals and states: the latter cannot, like 
the former, leave the state of nature by submitting to a sovereign authority.  
The right of a state can receive limited (i.e. not guaranteed) protection even in 
the absence of right for a state of nations or cosmopolitan right.271 States may 
exit the state of nature without compromising on their duties to their citizens 
by entering “a condition that is not a cosmopolitan commonwealth under a 
single head but is still a rightful condition of federation in accordance with a 
commonly agreed upon right of nations.”272 This voluntary federation or 
congress of nations is a cooperative mechanism that allows states to avoid a 
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conflict of duties while providing a limited (provisional) solution to the 
problems that characterize the state of nature. 273  Kant describes this 
approximation of a rightful condition by a congress of states bound to act 
according to commonly agreed laws as “the surrogate of the civil social 
union… that reason must connect necessarily with the concept of the right of 
[states].”274 The provisional right of states grounded in common consent 
imperfectly approximates conclusive right under a sovereign state of nations, 
and is based on the sovereign state as the prototypical international actor, as 
well as concepts such as territorial integrity, non-intervention, and the right to 
go to war.275  
Kant’s arguments for a voluntary congress rather than an international super-
state are compatible with his defense of an international state as a normative 
ideal,276 because they are not merely prudential or contingent on the nature of 
current political reality. Instead, they reflect an acknowledgment of two 
important conceptual distinctions. First, reason informs us about the nature of 
ideals in theory. However, when employed for practical ends, the exercise of 
reason must account for the imperfect and non-ideal nature of reality. This is 
why Kant emphasizes that acknowledging the imperfect nature of empirical 
reality does not require a complete rejection of ideals; the mere possibility of 
achieving these ideals suggests that we should at least attempt to do so.277 In 
the context of supranational right, universal peace may ultimately be 
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unachievable but this goal cannot simply be disregarded. The duty to work 
toward universal peace remains despite the impracticality of a sovereign 
super-state—the ideal means for this purpose.  
Second, Kant distinguishes between the means and end of international right. 
The ultimate goal is universal peace, whereas the only means of guaranteeing 
universal peace is the institution of a supranational sovereign to enforce 
international public right. The conflict faced by states between duties to their 
own citizens and to an overarching sovereign is a feature of imperfect reality, 
which rules out the only means of guaranteeing universal peace. Since the goal 
is more important than the means of achieving it, universal peace must be 
approximated to the greatest extent possible through means that are conducive 
to it (namely a congress of states).278  
The importance of a voluntary congress of states may therefore be understood 
in light of its capacity to promote universal peace without threatening it in the 
shorter term.279 Because “the severing of a bond of civil or cosmopolitan union 
even before a better constitution is ready to take its place is contrary to all 
political prudence, which agrees with morals in this, it would indeed be absurd 
to require that those defects be altered at once and violently.”280 Therefore, the 
“harmony of politics with morals is possible only within a federative union,” 
and “all political prudence has for its rightful basis the establishment of such a 
union in its greatest possible extent.”281 Kant even claims that “[s]omething of 
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this kind took place (at least as regards the formalities of the right of nations 
for the sake of keeping the peace) in the first half of the present century, in the 
assembly of the States General at the Hague.”282 More contemporary instances 
of a voluntary congress of states would include the United Nations and 
regional associations such as the European Union, and the Association of 
South East Asian Nations. 
One puzzle is how a pacific confederation could be viable if it allowed for 
secession and lacked coercive law.283 Although a voluntary congress of states 
cannot secure conclusive rights for its members, it provides a framework 
under which peaceful relations are possible with a diminished need to resort to 
hostilities and violence. Kant maintains that “only by such a congress can the 
idea of a public right of nations be realized, one to be established for deciding 
their disputes in a civil way, as if by a lawsuit, rather than in a barbaric way 
(the way of savages), namely by war.”284 In a voluntary congress, states 
submit to an analog of a court, which simulates the judicial element of the 
state apparatus. Fulfilling one primary function of public law, this judicial 
authority can impartially and disinterestedly interpret the dealings and 
relations between state parties. 285  Although the legislative and executive 
elements are absent because states do not submit to enforceable public laws 
under a sovereign authority, an international court helps to mitigate conflict by 
performing the judicial role of such an authority. Ultimately, the lack of 
coercive international law means that sovereign states are entitled to freely 
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determine their own affairs.286 States cannot be forced to comply with the 
international court’s rulings since this would contradict the basic idea of a 
people as a single self-determining and self-legislating political entity.287 
However, states can resolve disagreements peacefully by accepting decisions 
of the international court as binding. They are to “act as if there were a real, 
effective federal system operative at the global level,” and this would produce 
a stable and secure condition of rightful peace—the goal of international 
justice.288  
An international court makes a practical difference to interstate relations by 
providing an alternative to war;289 this constitutes a step toward universal 
peace even as states retain their individual rights. The international court’s 
authority is limited to pronouncing on cases of disagreement between states, 
and its decisions cannot be enforced given the absence of a supranational 
executive. This highly restricted role reflects a compromise between the right 
of states to avoid war with one another and the right of each state to protect its 
people’s sovereign will. States cannot—in view of the conflict with the duty to 
their citizens—simply submit to a supranational authority to secure conclusive 
public right between themselves. However, they can consent to the 
adjudication of conflicts by an international judicial authority (but not the 
enforcement of its judgments), thereby making possible the judicial element of 
state authority even if the legislative and executive elements are (at least 
presently) unattainable. The International Court of Justice is evidence of such 
an attempt to institute some degree of public right at the international level and 
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to get marginally closer to universal peace.290 Although an international court 
can adjudicate conflicts between states to mitigate indeterminacy in the 
exercise of states’ rights to self-defense, there is still the question of which 
laws are to be used in adjudicating conflicting claims. Without the legislative 
element of international public right, it is unclear which substantive standards 
the international court can or should appeal to in adjudicating conflicts. It 
therefore seems that even though an international court is a conceptually 
viable means of promoting universal peace, “the inherent tension between 
sovereignty and right cannot be [fully] resolved so long as these concepts are 
defined as they are in discussing right within the state.”291 Consequently, a 
comprehensive and coercive system of justice that nevertheless preserves state 
sovereignty is not only unlikely but conceptually impossible.292  
Although Kant has claimed that perpetual peace is impossible,293 cosmopolitan 
right is nevertheless the “next step in the evolution of right” following the 
establishment of the sovereign state and its domestic rightful condition.294 He 
acknowledges that various empirical conditions frustrate efforts to achieve 
universal peace and rule out a universal state modeled on a republic—the most 
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obvious possibility for achieving such peace.295 Yet, Kant demands that 
political actors create more favorable institutional conditions for peace, 
namely by promoting a pacific federation whose establishment would meet 
with less resistance but would nevertheless help to foster conditions amenable 
to an eventual transition to a universal state. 296 
Kant’s arguments for universal peace are far from contradictory. Despite being 
fully cognizant of the gap between ideals and practical reality, he maintains 
that it is important to respect the duty to promote universal peace given its 
theoretical possibility and the normative authority of reason.297 Perhaps the 
most striking feature of Kant’s conceptions of cosmopolitan right in both 
formal and substantive senses is his account of empirical limitations on 
achieving ideal conditions of right. This is analogous to how Kant’s system of 
right simultaneously supports the idea that poverty relief is necessary for a 
public rightful condition that guarantees external freedom, and places heavy 
restrictions on the means by which relief efforts can be executed. The next 
chapter will elaborate on the implications of limited international public right 
on the prospects for cross-border poverty relief. 
 
 
                                                
295 James Bohman, “The Public Spheres of the World Citizen,” in Perpetual Peace: Essays on 
Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal, edited by James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 179. 
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5. Hospitality and Economic Refuge 
Redistribution to relieve poverty across borders is indefensible as a matter of 
justice, although it may be justified as an unenforceable ethical duty of 
beneficence. The duty to approximate universal peace does not entail any duty 
of justice to foster public right or mutual obligations between the wealthy and 
poor across the world as in a single state.298 Ultimately, as the third chapter 
concludes, poverty relief for Kant is obligatory only within a civil condition, 
where state authorities are bound to protect their citizens’ rights to 
independence. This chapter defends a conceptual argument for cross-border 
poverty relief based on Kant’s cosmopolitan right to hospitality, which 
suggests that the poor have a right to economic migration and may exercise 
this right to seek protection from the state of nature.299 All human beings have 
a cosmopolitan right to hospitality in foreign countries based on their original 
right to collective ownership of the earth.300 Although cosmopolitan right in its 
substantive sense is limited to hospitality, Kant specifies that states may turn 
foreigners away only if this can be done without destroying them.301 Since the 
state of nature is marked by a constant threat of war and conflict, people 
remain susceptible to destruction until they enter a civil rightful condition. 
Having been excluded from a rightful condition, the poor are in constant 
danger of destruction.302 I argue that the poor have a right to refuge in foreign 
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states—which are obliged to accommodate them as long as they respect local 
laws—given that they have no civil rightful condition to return to and could 
otherwise perish in the state of nature.303 
This Kantian approach to the problem of poverty generates an interesting and 
counterintuitive observation: cross-border poverty relief is not necessarily a 
matter of resource redistribution between states. Poverty relief may instead be 
a matter of ‘redistributing’ individuals across state boundaries. Where a 
person’s basic needs are unmet, his or her economic need amounts to a denial 
of his or her human rights,304 despite the distinction between seeking refuge 
and economic migration that is often made in international law. Although this 
argument for relief is theoretically defensible, the provisional nature of 
international public right implies that states may not intervene in one another’s 
affairs to enforce the poor’s right to relief. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, an international super-state (that secures public right through 
universal reciprocal coercion to which all states could consent) is conceptually 
impossible. Consequently, the right to relief cannot be enforced because there 
are no legitimate means for doing so. Where states are the primary agents of 
relief, this right remains unenforceable and merely provisional in the absence 
of an international super-state that could publicly coerce a state into providing 
relief to its own citizens or granting refuge to impoverished foreigners. I aim 
to demonstrate that intervention on the pretext of remedying the target state’s 
                                                                                                                           
and “Malaysia and Thailand Turn Away Hundreds on Migrant Boats.” The Guardian. May 
14, 2015. Accessed August 11, 2015. 
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failure to fulfill the duty of relief (i.e. intervention that instigates a hindrance 
to a hindrance to the poor’s rights) is essentially unilateral and inconsistent 
with Kant’s demand for universal reciprocal coercion, no matter how well-
intentioned or effective it may be.  
 
5.1 The Cosmopolitan Right to Hospitality 
The general attempt to achieve universal peace cannot be abandoned simply 
because the final goal is unattainable.305 Short of achieving a secure and 
enduring, as well as rightful peace, cosmopolitan right nevertheless supports 
the institution of public right at the supranational level by opening up 
possibilities for public law and a universal commonwealth. Acknowledging 
the existence of global concerns, Kant emphasizes that because 
the (narrower or wider) community of the nations of the earth has 
now gone so far that a violation of right on one place of the earth is 
felt in all, the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastic and 
exaggerated way of representing right; it is, instead, a supplement to 
the unwritten code of the right of a state and the right of nations 
necessary for the sake of any public rights of human beings and so 
for perpetual peace; only under this condition can we flatter 
ourselves that we are constantly approaching perpetual peace.306 
Cosmopolitan right does not contradict the right of a state307 because the 
state’s duties to foreign persons are fundamentally different from those to its 
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own citizens (i.e. the former are entitled to hospitality, which is irrelevant to 
the latter). In fact, it supplements the state-centric right of a state and right of 
states with a universal regard for human beings as joint owners of the earth’s 
physical space.  
The cosmopolitan right to hospitality is based on the following line of 
reasoning:  
A) All human beings have an original right to occupy space.  
B) The earth’s physical space is finite and its occupancy is exclusive. 
C) Therefore, this original right translates into an original right to common 
possession of the earth. 
D) This entails a right to visit and enjoy hospitality in foreign lands.  
The “right to visit [and] to present oneself for society” is based on the need for 
human beings to share the earth’s physical space, which suggests that 
originally no one was more entitled than anyone else to be in a particular 
location. 308  Kant states that prior to any act of acquisition, all persons 
originally possess land in conformity with right, having been born as an 
occupant of space and having a right to “be wherever nature or chance (apart 
from their will) has placed them.”309 Original possession in common, says 
Kant, is “a practical rational concept which contains a priori the principle in 
accordance with which alone men can use a place on the earth in accordance 
with the principles of Right.”310 This practical rational concept also expresses 
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the “relations of systematic interdependence that obtain between individuals in 
virtue of the unavoidable unity of places on the earth.”311  
In contrast, states are generally founded on specific geographical territories, 
yet their rights to these territories are not original but acquired, and merely 
provisional in the absence of a supranational authority to enforce them. 312 
National boundaries are both artificial and provisional, while the contiguity of 
the earth’s surface ensures material interdependence and makes possible 
universal and potentially unlimited interaction.313 Therefore, Kant states in 
Perpetual Peace that cosmopolitan right “shall be limited to conditions of 
universal hospitality,” explaining that “it is not a question of philanthropy but 
of right, so that hospitality (hospitableness) means the right of a foreigner not 
to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on the land of another.”314 
The cosmopolitan right to hospitality is, in Kant’s view, the minimally 
necessary condition for establishing peaceful relations between states, 
especially through commercial means.315 Kant explains that “this right to 
hospitality—that is, the authorization of a foreign newcomer—does not extend 
beyond the conditions which make it possible to seek commerce with the old 
inhabitants,” although it does allow “distant parts of the world [to] enter 
peaceably into relations with one another, which can eventually become 
publicly lawful and so finally bring the human race ever closer to a 
cosmopolitan constitution.” 316  Insofar as these relations are peaceful and 
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characterized by respect for right, 317  they eventually pave the way for 
international public law, which is one central element of a cosmopolitan 
commonwealth. The cosmopolitan right to hospitality thus helps to bridge the 
conceptual gap between the existing international system, which is grounded 
in the provisional right of states, and the unachievable ideal of a publicly 
rightful international super-state.  
  
5.2 The Right to Economic Refuge 
In the first place, wealthier states and persons are not obliged to contribute 
resources to impoverished foreigners, because they have no enforceable duties 
to those with whom they do not share in a civil rightful condition. As 
mentioned in the third chapter, it is only within a civil rightful condition that 
the state can legitimately tax the wealthy to redistribute resources to the poor. 
However, in the absence of a universal state or cosmopolitan commonwealth, 
there is no rightful condition that could constitute sufficient grounds for an 
enforceable duty of relief to impoverished foreigners.318 This is because the 
problem lies not in the existence of national boundaries, but in the failure of 
states to provide for their own citizens. National boundaries may perpetuate 
global problems such as inequality of opportunity and poverty,319 but each 
state has a duty to resolve these problems—which threaten the capacity of its 
                                                
317 For instance, Kant (see “Toward Perpetual Peace,” 329-30 (8:358-59)) vehemently objects 
to the violent treatment of indigenous peoples by foreign settlers. 
318 This does not preclude the existence of a moral obligation to relieve poverty across borders, 
although I will not address the prospects for such a moral duty in this thesis, which focuses on 
duties of justice. 
319 See Ripstein, 297. Ripstein explains how this compatibility can be attributed to Kant’s 
equation of mere wish and need. 
     77 
 
citizens to share in a united will—within its own borders. 320  Rightful 
international and cosmopolitan relations ideally presuppose internally just 
states, where the “cosmopolitan analogue of the duty to support the poor is not 
world citizenship, but the division of the world into states in a way that 
guarantees that each person has a home state to return to.”321 In other words, 
the problem of poverty can ultimately be attributed to the failure of states to 
provide for those living under their coercive authority.  
Although approaches to poverty relief focusing on resource redistribution 
seem more intuitive and have received much attention,322 I argue that cross-
border poverty relief by means of redistribution is inconsistent with Kant’s 
system of right for two reasons. First, this approach requires a public rightful 
condition between states, which I have shown to be conceptually impossible. 
Second, it is not clear how a redistributive duty to foreigners can be derived 
from or made compatible with Kant’s argument (as I have interpreted it) that 
redistribution is justifiable only in the context of states’ responsibility for 
securing their citizens’ rights in a public setting. 
In contrast, the cosmopolitan right to hospitality suggests a different approach 
to the problem of addressing poverty outside one’s national borders, in the 
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event that states fail to fulfill their duty of relief to their own citizens.323 
Kant’s cosmopolitan right of universal hospitality posits that a state can turn a 
foreigner away only “if this can be done without destroying him, but as long 
as he behaves peaceably where he is, he cannot be treated with hostility.”324 
On account of the original human right to joint ownership of the earth’s 
surface, foreigners must be allowed to visit as long as they respect the local 
state’s acquired territorial rights and domestic laws. The state’s provisional 
territorial rights are threatened only when foreigners fail to respect local laws 
and upset domestic public right. In this case, the state is entitled to take 
unilateral action to protect itself by refusing entry to such foreigners, because 
each state is in a condition of nature in relation to foreign states and 
individuals. However, where there is no threat to domestic public right, one 
kind of violence that foreigners cannot rightly be subjected to is being 
compelled to die because they have been refused entry into state borders. 
Since the state of nature is characterized by the threat of warfare and 
destruction, and the poor are characterized by their exclusion from a rightful 
condition, states must grant entry to impoverished foreigners who have no 
rightful condition to return to. 
One possible objection to my argument is that states do not subject the poor to 
the threat of destruction by refusing them entry, since the poor are already 
threatened with destruction in the state of nature and have merely been denied 
one option by which they can leave this lawless condition. However, this 
objection is inconsistent with Kant’s framework of right. While the poor may 
not in fact be worse off (such as by being subjected to a new or additional 
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threat), being refused entry into a foreign state amounts to unjustifiable 
deprivation of their right to leave the state of nature. Short of actively harming 
the poor, failing to help them is also wrong because it ensures that they 
continue to be threatened with destruction.325 Specifically, I argue that refusing 
entry to impoverished foreigners is wrong because states cannot do so without 
threat to their own moral personality. Refusing entry to economic refugees 
constitutes a unilateral enforcement of the state’s acquired territorial rights, to 
the point of denying the original right of all human beings to joint possession 
of the earth and to hospitality. This undermines the state’s moral personality 
that is, in the first place, premised on the original rights of human beings. The 
state’s acquired right to its territory cannot be exercised at the expense of 
human beings’ original right to hospitality for two reasons. First, except where 
the former is threatened, there is insufficient cause to deny the latter. Second, 
it is contradictory to do so because the right of a state presupposes and cannot 
therefore be exercised to violate original or innate human rights.  
The innate right of human beings and the acquired right of states to their 
territories are both provisional, given the lack of an enforcement mechanism: 
the ideal but impractical cosmopolitan or universal commonwealth. States and 
foreign persons are in a condition of nature in relation to one another, since 
there is no supranational sovereign that secures universal public right. Both 
kinds of agents are entitled to exercise unilateral force in protecting their 
respective provisional rights from external threats, and so states may 
unilaterally enforce their acquired territorial rights by refusing entry to 
foreigners whose failure to respect local laws threatens the right of states to 
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preserve a civil rightful condition. In the absence of such a threat, both the 
acquired territorial rights of states and the cosmopolitan right of human beings 
to hospitality can coexist. In this case, there is no threat to the state and it has 
no reason to defend its territorial rights by denying hospitality to foreigners. 
Apart from the lack of sufficient cause, states simply cannot without 
contradiction deny foreigners’ rights to economic refuge unless its domestic 
rightful condition is threatened. As shown in the second chapter, the basis of 
the right of a state is the innate and private rights of its citizens, and these 
include the original right to possession in common of the earth and to 
hospitality in foreign states. The state’s territorial right is essentially a united 
expression of its citizens’ innate individual innate rights to jointly possess and 
occupy space on the earth. This means that the acquired right of a state to its 
territory presupposes the innate right of human beings to common possession 
of the earth and its corollary but equally innate (i.e. not requiring any act of 
acquisition) right to hospitality.326 It would therefore be contradictory for the 
former to be exercised in a manner that violates the latter—as in the case 
where states refuse entry to economic refugees who have a right to exist 
somewhere. In general, human beings cannot justifiably be denied their 
original right to hospitality, especially where something as fundamental as 
self-preservation is at stake. The only exception is where foreigners violate 
local laws and thereby threaten the local state’s moral personality, thus 
warranting the latter’s defensive unilateral enforcement of its territorial rights. 
Otherwise, granting foreigners the right of entry (when they respect local 
laws) may arguably erode the integrity of a state’s boundaries, but would not 
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constitute a threat to the state’s self-preservation. Ultimately, states may 
defend their moral personality by denying entry to economic refugees who 
violate local laws, but in the absence of this threat, rejecting economic 
refugees would instead undermine their own moral personality. 
 
5.3 Limitations on the Right to Cross-Border Poverty Relief 
Although economic refugees have a right to hospitality in foreign countries, 
this does not guarantee them entry into a civil rightful condition and complete 
security from the state of nature. Until an economic refugee obtains legal 
status as a citizen, the foreign state in which she resides neither represents her 
will nor acts as her public authority to fully protect her rights.327 In the first 
place, exercising the cosmopolitan right to enter and visit foreign countries 
does not preclude the possibility of acquiring citizenship there and entering a 
rightful condition under the authority of that state. Unless the poor have been 
denied the right to visit because of their failure to respect local laws, their 
obedience to local laws is essentially an expression of consent to be subject to 
the local sovereign. This expression of consent would provide the basis for the 
exercise not only of their right to visit, but also the right to enter a civil 
condition by becoming a protected citizen of the state. Acquiring citizenship 
in this manner is consistent with right, because it establishes a reciprocal 
relationship between the foreigner and the state. The former consents to abide 
by the latter’s laws and be subjected to its coercive authority, and the latter in 
turn protects the former’s rights. Impoverished persons could become citizens 
of a foreign state if they could share in the united will on which its civil 
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rightful condition is based. This manner of entering a rightful condition may 
be observed in practice with countries granting foreign nationals permanent 
residency or citizenship status after having fulfilled certain conditions such as 
having lived and worked locally for a certain number of years.  
Nevertheless, states reserve the right to withhold citizenship from economic 
refugees. States may not refuse entry to and subject impoverished foreigners 
to the threat of destruction in the state of nature, although they may choose not 
to grant these foreigners citizenship rights. The poor’s right to leave the state 
of nature by entering a foreign state is limited to the right to visit, and does not 
include the right to citizenship or even “the right to be a guest (for this a 
special beneficent pact would be required, making him a member of the 
household for a certain time).”328 Kant emphasizes that “the right of citizens of 
the world to try to establish community with all and, to this end, to visit all 
regions of the earth… [it] is not, however, a right to make a settlement on the 
land of another nation (ius incolatus); for this, a specific contract is 
required.” 329  Citizenship rights depend on the consent of both foreign 
individual and state to enter into a mutually binding compact, which is distinct 
from the cosmopolitan right to hospitality. This raises the question of whether 
cosmopolitan right could genuinely allow the poor to escape the state of nature 
and the threat of destruction that characterizes it. Even though it does not 
guarantee membership within a rightful condition, the cosmopolitan right to 
hospitality and economic refuge means that the poor nevertheless receive 
some degree of protection from the state of nature. Just as the imperfect 
rightful condition characterized by the provisional right of states approximates 
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conclusive right under a universal state of nations, the partial protection 
afforded to impoverished foreigners by the cosmopolitan right to hospitality 
approximates full protection enjoyed by citizens of a sovereign state.  
The argument made in chapter 3 for unconditional poverty relief by the state 
suggests a possible problem. If public right and the state’s legitimacy are 
collectively undermined by the existence of impoverished persons within state 
borders, it appears that providing refuge to impoverished foreigners would be 
extremely detrimental to the host state. Impoverished citizens and refugees are 
similarly deprived of their personal freedom and the capacity to share in the 
united will (without which the state’s authority is illegitimate). However, the 
key difference between them is that states reserve the right to grant refugees 
the right to visit on the condition that the latter respects local laws. This means 
that for refugees, respect for public right in the host state is a prerequisite for 
the right to hospitality, failing which the host state has the right to reject them. 
Refugees do not therefore pose the same threat to public right that 
impoverished citizens do. The fact that refugees are deprived of their freedom 
remains a pressing problem in itself, but this neither constitutes a threat to the 
host state nor obliges it to rectify this problem on the same basis that applies to 
citizens. 
A related question is whether states can fulfill their duty of hospitality to 
economic refugees by redistributing some resources to them instead of 
granting them refuge. As discussed in the third chapter, the state has a public 
right to fulfill its duty of relief to its citizens by redistributing resources among 
them from the wealthy to the poor. This suggests that states are under no 
obligation of justice to redistribute resources to impoverished foreigners who 
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are external to the civil rightful condition of the state, although they may do so 
out of beneficence (a moral obligation). It is wrong for a state to refuse entry 
to an impoverished foreigner who could subsequently die without protection 
(unless the latter has violated local laws), yet it is not clearly wrong to refuse 
him entry if the state provides him with the resources necessary to avoid 
destruction, such as sufficient food, water and safe passage to another state 
where refuge or citizenship may be sought. Providing economic refugees with 
material resources alone before sending them on their way would not suffice, 
since without some degree of protection they could still be destroyed in the 
state of nature before they arrive at their next destination. If safe passage were 
also guaranteed by the state, this could arguably count as temporary refuge 
from the condition of nature no worse than what economic refugees would 
enjoy as visitors. Leaving aside for now the practical question of what kinds 
and amounts of resources are necessary for safe passage to another state, and 
if a state could in reality supply these to impoverished foreigners, there is at 
least a theoretical possibility for states to respect the cosmopolitan rights of 
economic refugees without having to take them in.  
Migration is a means for the poor, who are in a state of nature as a result of 
their exclusion from a rightful condition, to exercise their rights to freedom 
and self-preservation. Although international law tends to distinguish between 
refuge-seeking and economic migration, the poor are entitled to relief in the 
form of the right to seek economic refuge, 330  given that their extreme 
economic need constitutes a denial of their innate human rights. This right to 
                                                
330 One interesting question this finding raises is whether there are or could be other grounds 
for a right to migrate, but for the purposes of this thesis I will leave this issue aside for future 
discussion. 
     85 
 
security from extreme economic need and private dependence on the charity 
of others is derived from the innate right of human beings to freedom and self-
preservation. The exercise of this right to seek security does not, however, 
guarantee the poor entry into a rightful condition under which their rights can 
be conclusive.331 This is because the poor’s right to self-preservation and 
freedom from debilitating economic need, exercised via the cosmopolitan 
right of human beings to visit foreign lands, is at best provisional in the 
absence of a supranational sovereign power to enforce states’ compliance with 
the obligation to respect these rights. 
 
5.4 The Unenforceable Right to Refuge  
Despite the conceptual justification for a right to economic refuge, this right 
can as a matter of fact be violated at any time, because states’ obligations to 
respect it are unenforceable in the absence of a supranational sovereign.332 
Poverty relief at the civil and supranational levels are primarily duties of the 
state, but these duties can be enforced only within a rightful condition secured 
by an international sovereign whose authority derives from the united will of 
                                                
331 In order to actually enter a rightful condition, the poor may have to relocate multiple times 
before settling in a state that can grant them citizenship rights. Since the approach adopted in 
this thesis is primarily theoretical, I will leave aside the practical issue of which kinds of 
factors affect the need (or lack thereof) to relocate before gaining citizenship status in a state. 
332 This obligation to respect the right of foreigners to visit is sometimes violated for practical 
reasons rather than on principle. For instance, Malaysia and other countries have provided 
outcome-oriented arguments against allowing the boat people on their shores, such as the 
consequence of encouraging more to try, which would not be sustainable. (See Euan McKirdy 
and Saima Mohsin. “Lost at Sea, Unwanted: The Plight of Myanmar's Rohingya 'Boat 
People’,” CNN (May 20, 2015). Accessed August 11, 2015. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/19/asia/rohingya-refugee-ships-explainer/) These practical 
considerations may be relevant to long-term solutions to the problems faced by the boat 
people, but they do not constitute principled rejections of the obligation to help the boat 
people, and are certainly not valid justifications for sending boatloads of people to their 
deaths. Given the theoretical focus of this project, I will leave these issues aside for further 
consideration elsewhere. 
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all states.333 As the previous chapter has explained, the potential for conflict 
between the state’s duty to its citizens and its duty to a supranational sovereign 
makes it impossible for the state to submit to such a sovereign power without 
jeopardizing its people’s interests. Because states could not agree to be 
subjected to an overarching sovereign, they are not in a rightful condition in 
relation to one another. States are therefore governed by the right of states, 
which includes rights to state sovereignty and to resort to unilateral force for 
self-preservation.334 In the absence of international public right, states cannot 
be prohibited from exercising merely unilateral force to compel others to 
provide for their own citizens or accept economic refugees. Ironically, the 
provisional nature of the right to relief implies that the poor’s right to relief 
cannot be legitimately enforced and that illegitimate attempts to enforce this 
right also cannot be prohibited. Although states cannot be prohibited from 
acting unilaterally to coerce others into fulfilling their duties of relief, such 
unilateral coercion is unjust because it could not be consistent with public 
right.335 Furthermore, foreign intervention in sovereign states violates the right 
of state sovereignty, thereby undermining the utility of the right of states in 
approximating universal peace. 
For Kant, the possession of a right and its rightful exercise are both crucial 
matters of justice. Although foreign intervention, as with coercion in general, 
can be justified as a hindrance to a hindrance, its means must also be just. 
                                                
333 Varden argues that the UNHCR (The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(see “History of UNHCR,” UNHCR News (Accessed August 11, 2015) 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbc.html) is a “global public institution [that] represents 
both states and refugees, and it is the means through which states and refugee interaction are 
made rightful.” (see “A Kantian Conception of Global Justice,” 2051-2052 (footnote)) 
334 See Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 482 (6:343-344); and Shell, 174. 
335 The term ‘unilateral’ does not necessarily indicate the involvement of a single party, but is 
used in contrast to ‘omnilateral’, which indicates the involvement of all parties. In other 
words, ‘unilateral’ refers to any number of parties less than the total. 
     87 
 
Actions are right when they conform to existing law, but where there are no 
established legal standards, an action is right “if and only if its maxim is 
consistent with a possible universal law” and it thereby makes possible an 
instantiation of right.336 Kant therefore understands the requirement of acting 
externally so that one’s actions accord with right, as tantamount to a 
permission to force others to act rightly or to obstruct wrong actions.337 The 
problem is that where there are no established legal standards, there is an 
“implausibly low” threshold for just conduct.338 But even where coercion is 
arguably justified, there remains the problem of determining which agents are 
justified in applying the coercion.339 I suggest that Kant’s answer must be that 
coercion is legitimate only when exercised by a public authority to which all 
subjects could consent. The state serves as this public authority that enforces a 
rightful condition among individual citizens, but there is no analogous public 
authority under which states could be subjected to universal reciprocal 
coercion. This limitation in the analogy between persons and states explains 
why states cannot legitimately be subjected to external coercion. 
Arguably, for Kant, state sovereignty is relative and only provisionally 
legitimate because it depends on popular sovereignty.340 This interpretation 
cannot be correct. Kant recognizes various kinds of states as sovereign even 
though he claims that only the republican constitution is consistent with the 
idea of an original contract establishing the united will.341 A state that fails to 
represent its people’s united will also fails to achieve a public rightful 
                                                
336 Pogge, “Is Kant’s Rechtslehre a ‘Comprehensive Liberalism?” 142. 
337 Ibid., 142-43. 
338 Pogge also suggests possibilities for mitigating this problem. See “Is Kant’s Rechtslehre a 
‘Comprehensive Liberalism?” 144. 
339 Murphy, 94. 
340 Cavallar, 57-58. 
341 Ibid., 57-58. 
     88 
 
condition342 in which freedom is both the principle and condition for any 
exercise of coercion.343 Yet, Kant also recognizes that the state’s constitution 
is only its empirical form, and “the various types—“autocratic, aristocratic, 
democratic, or mixed—express the variety of relationships which can obtain 
between this ‘higher power’ and the people.”344 The specific form of a state’s 
constitution is merely incidental to history and not objectively necessary in 
maintaining civil order.345  
Even imperfectly just states that preserve a rightful condition for their citizens 
have the right to make decisions and act on the basis of their peoples’ united 
wills. Any forcible interference against such states violates their freedom of 
choice,346 which—as discussed in the fourth chapter—is a provisional right of 
states. Kant’s idea of justice is evidently progressive rather than static. In 
reconciling the demands of justice with empirical reality, history and human 
nature, he conceives of imperfectly just states as “unavoidable precursors of 
fully just states,” and “historically necessary presuppositions of progress 
toward full justice,” even if there is no guarantee of attaining this.347 Arguably, 
this implies that all imperfectly just states must be recognized as legitimate, in 
recognition of the fact that the conditions for justice must be carefully and 
gradually cultivated.348 Any state which has a law-governed constitution at 
least upholds the idea of law and protects public right and external freedom for 
                                                
342 Varden, “Kant’s Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy—How Public Right 
‘Concludes’ Private Right in the “Doctrine of Right”,” 347-48. 
343 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 480 (6:340). 
344 Shell, 165. 
345 Ibid., 165. 
346 Georg Cavallar and August Reinisch, “Kant, Intervention and the ‘Failed State’,” in Kant 
and Law, edited by B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006), 
437. 
347 Rosen, 128. 
348 Ibid., 128. 
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its citizens,349 and is therefore better than nothing even if it is only minimally 
just.350 Such states have a perfect duty to maintain themselves by preserving 
the civil condition, and an imperfect duty of self-perfection by improving their 
constitutions.351 The right of states entitles all states to govern their relations 
on the basis of a set of provisional rules grounded in common agreement, 
including the right to mutual respect for sovereign statehood, thereby 
approximating an international rightful condition.  
Despite the general prohibition against violating state sovereignty, 
intervention against sovereign states may be justifiable if the target state’s 
actions contravene international law and the right of states. Kant’s criteria of 
justice are relational in nature: the basic forms of injustice are force and fraud, 
as expressed in the Roman law maxim “volenti non fit injuria (to one who has 
consented no wrong is done)”.352 The right of states is based on this relational 
principle, which grounds the obligation to respect the internal constitution and 
moral personality of other states and to refrain from exercising unilateral 
coercion over them,353 as well as the rights to defensive and preventive war.354 
Some scholars have argued that it is “no longer tenable to assert that whenever 
a government massacres its own people or a state collapses into anarchy 
international law forbids military intervention altogether.” 355  Failing to 
provide a public rightful condition for one’s own citizens does not inherently 
                                                
349 Pogge, “Kant’s Theory of Justice,” 424. 
350 Rosen (119) goes further than I would in arguing for Kant’s “belief that there is a duty to 
be a member of political society, regardless of whether it is just or unjust, as long as it 
provides an alternative to the lawless state of nature,” although he also acknowledges that this 
is “a highly controversial notion.” 
351 Byrd, “The State as a ‘Moral Person’,” 380. 
352 Rosen, 17. 
353 Cavallar and Reinisch, 435. 
354 Byrd, “The State as a ‘Moral Person’,” 384. 
355 See Cavallar and Reinisch, 432. 
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count as injustice against other states, although a plausible argument for 
interference on the basis of the target state’s internal problems is that when a 
state faces a crisis, the internal politics of its neighbors are unavoidably 
affected.356 
However, as a feature of the right of states, the prohibition against intervention 
generally holds “as long as [a state’s] internal conflict is not yet critical, [for] 
such interference of foreign powers would be a violation of the right of a 
people dependent upon no other and only struggling with its internal illness; 
thus it would itself be a scandal given and would make the autonomy of all 
states insecure.”357 In Perpetual Peace, Kant argues that the only case in 
which coercive foreign intervention would not violate the right of states is 
when the target state suffers from “critical” internal conflict and anarchy to the 
extent that it is no longer sovereign.358 State sovereignty is undefined and 
absent where there is civil conflict and domestic contestation over sovereign 
power. If a state “through internal discord, should split into two parts, each 
putting itself forward as a separate state and laying claim to the whole; in that 
case a foreign state could not be charged with interfering in the constitution of 
another state if it gave assistance to one of them (for this is anarchy).”359 
Under these circumstances, the absence of a distinctive sovereign authority 
that preserves a civil rightful condition means that there is no sovereignty to 
be violated by foreign intervention. Kant’s qualification that a state’s civil 
conflict must be “critical” enough may be vague, yet it is clear that foreign 
                                                
356 Ibid.,  434. 
357 Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace,” 319-20 (8:346). 
358 Ibid., 319-20 (8:346). 
359 Ibid., 319 (8:346). 
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intervention will not violate state sovereignty only when the united will of the 
people in the target state is seriously fragmented.  
Although absence of sovereignty in the target state implies that foreign 
interveners will not be culpable for violating the right of states, the 
permissibility of intervention is not otherwise unlimited. Kant’s critique of 
colonization as an abuse of cosmopolitan right expresses a clear objection to 
unilateral force, even when its target is not a sovereign state. He describes how  
the inhospitable behavior of civilized, especially commercial, states 
in our part of the world, the injustice they show in visiting foreign 
lands and peoples (which with them is tantamount to conquering 
them) goes to horrifying lengths. When America, the negro countries, 
the Spice Islands, the Cape, and so forth were discovered, they were, 
to them, countries belonging to no one, since they counted the 
inhabitants as nothing. In the East Indies (Hindustan), they brought in 
foreign soldiers under the pretext of merely proposing to set up 
trading posts, but with them oppression of the inhabitants, incitement 
of the various Indian states to widespread wars, famine, rebellions, 
treachery, and the whole litany of troubles that oppress the human 
race.360 
Even if an indigenous people does not have a civil rightful condition of the 
kind that would qualify as a sovereign state, it is wrong for colonial powers to 
violate their human rights to freedom and self-preservation, as well as their 
provisional rights to the lands they first occupied. The cosmopolitan right to 
visit other lands and establish relations with foreign peoples is based on the 
                                                
360 Ibid., 329 (8:358-59). 
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human right to common ownership of the earth’s surface. This right is abused 
when foreigners oppress and deprive indigenous peoples of their lands, 
thereby violating the latter’s provisional right to these lands, which has its 
basis in the original right of all human beings to possession of the earth in 
common. It is obviously unjust to exploit and conquer foreign peoples, but the 
fact that Kant limits cosmopolitan right to hospitality in foreign lands—even 
when these are not sovereign state territories—demonstrates how the absence 
of state sovereignty is a necessary but insufficient condition for foreign 
intervention. 
The strongest case that can be made for foreign intervention is where two 
necessary conditions are met. First, the target state lacks genuine sovereignty; 
therefore the intervener would not be guilty of violating state sovereignty. 
Second, intervention is aimed at posing a hindrance to a hindrance to right. 
However, even when these necessary conditions are both met, the sufficient 
condition for justifiable foreign intervention is unfulfilled where there is no 
supranational sovereign power to publicly authorize such uses of force. 
Foreign intervention can never qualify as universal reciprocal coercion that 
has been publicly authorized by a sovereign power to which the intervening 
and target states could both consent to be subjected.361 Even where foreign 
intervention in troubled or non-sovereign ‘states’ is both permissible (in that it 
does not violate state sovereignty) and collectively initiated by several 
                                                
361 Even the argument that there is tacit universal consent for all human beings to be entitled to 
exercise their basic rights would not work. This line of argument cannot justify foreign 
intervention as consistent with right, given the absence of an overarching sovereign power to 
authorize such coercive action, since states could not consent to the institution of such a 
supranational sovereign authority.  
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states,362 it is a unilateral action that cannot be fully consistent with Kant’s 
framework of right. Because intervention is inherently coercive while its 
public authorization is conceptually impossible, it could never fulfill Kant’s 
positive criterion of justice, which is that only universal reciprocal coercion is 
just.363 Only coercion authorized by a global authority is compatible with 
rightful peace,364 because only a global public authority can in principle act on 
behalf of the stateless people, and no state or group of states can fulfill such a 
role.365 This is why resorting to unilateral military action, even with the 
intention of promoting justice, is not in principle compatible with rightful 
international relations.366  
Ultimately, Kant’s defense of state sovereignty and his principle of non-
intervention do not contradict his arguments for qualified humanitarian 
intervention in failed states.367 As a matter of right, foreign intervention has an 
ambiguous status: it is clearly wrong when it violates the target state’s 
sovereignty; but even when it is theoretically permissible in non-sovereign or 
failed states, there is at best a provisional right to intervene, since the means 
for such coercive action could not be publicly authorized. I propose that 
Kant’s sense of ‘right’ cannot therefore accommodate a sufficient justification 
of foreign intervention, even for the purposes of poverty relief. The rights of 
the poor ought to be protected, but in the absence of an overarching sovereign 
authority, it is unjust for states to be externally coerced into providing relief to 
                                                
362 See Varden’s argument against the “unilateralism of powerful states” in “A Kantian 
Conception of Global Justice,” 2057. 
363 I therefore disagree with the argument made by Cavallar and Reinisch (see 437), that 
intervention seems acceptable where the target state lacks a lawful constitution. 
364 Varden, “A Kantian Conception of Global Justice,” 2051. 
365 Ibid., 2051-52 (footnote). 
366 Ibid.,  2046. 
367 For a discussion of this apparent conflict, see Cavallar, 58. 
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their own citizens or to impoverished foreigners. States also cannot exercise 
merely unilateral coercion to compel other states or non-sovereign peoples to 
provide relief to their own members or to admit economic refugees. Ironically, 
the absence of a supranational sovereign authority means that foreign 
intervention can neither be legitimately (based on what all parties involved 
could consent to) authorized when it is well intentioned, nor legitimately 
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6. The Provisional Right to Relief 
Ultimately, in the absence of an overarching rightful condition secured by a 
coercive sovereign authority, there are no grounds on which any cross-border 
exercise of coercive power could be legitimate. More generally, no coercive 
effort to relieve poverty—except that of a state for its own citizens—can be 
consistent with right. I have argued that in the absence of public right, 
individuals lack security in exercising their innate and private rights. 
Therefore, they unite to form the state: a public rightful condition that requires 
for its preservation unconditional poverty relief for all citizens. Outside the 
state, all right is at best provisional, since a coercive supranational sovereign 
authority is conceptually impossible. As a result, states may be obliged to 
accommodate economic refugees out of respect for their cosmopolitan right to 
hospitality, but this right is unenforceable. This leads me to conclude that 
coercion is legitimate only within a rightful condition, outside of which all 
exercises of force, however beneficent, are merely unilateral and wrong.368 
The conceptual impossibility of a supranational sovereign means that states 
cannot be coerced into fulfilling their duties of relief to citizens or economic 
refugees.  
My argument suggests that even if we view relieving poverty to be a critical 
element in protecting the human right to freedom, there is no single ‘right’ 
way to achieve it. I have demonstrated how Kant’s system of right consistently 
supports two different justifications for poverty relief: domestic poverty relief 
by means of public redistribution, and relief to impoverished foreigners by 
granting them refuge. This leads me to identify two avenues for further 
                                                
368 Williams, “Towards a Kantian Theory of International Distributive Justice,” 67. 
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research. First, examining the viability of other arguments for poverty relief 
that do not focus solely on resource redistribution could be one way forward 
for debates within the international distributive justice literature. Second, 
given the absence of international public right as the key impediment to 
enforcing the poor’s right to relief, further exploring the constraints on 
justifying relief could be instructive in delimiting the appropriate scope and 
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